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An estimated 60,000 forensic evaluations are conducted annually to determine if 
defendants meet the legal standard of competence to stand trial (CST); that is, if 
defendants have the ability to consult with their attorney, as well as if they have a rational 
and factual understanding of their charges. Estimated rates of feigning (i.e., faking or 
exaggerating of deficits or symptoms) in CST evaluations have ranged from 8% to 21%. 
Given this prevalence, it is necessary for forensic evaluators to have access to 
psychometrically sound instruments that can aid in the detection of feigning. Performance 
validity tests (PVTs) are designed to detect poor effort and response styles indicative of 
feigning. The Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK) is a PVT that was designed to detect 
feigned incompetence to stand trial. The current study examined the usefulness of the 
ILK in a psychiatric inpatient sample for the detection of feigning, with a focus on the 
instrument’s psychometric properties. Support was found for adequate reliability; 
however, evidence for construct and convergent validity were lacking. Several items that 
were long in length and had correct answers of “false” appeared to be difficult for the 
participants. Prior incarceration, having a forensic status, and a later onset of illness were 
related to higher ILK total scores. Future research recommendations, as well as concerns 
regarding the use of the ILK in inpatient settings were also addressed. 
Keywords: competence to stand trial, feigning, forensic evaluations, performance 
validity tests, psychometric properties
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Inventory of Legal Knowledge: 
An Examination of Psychometric Properties in an Inpatient Psychiatric Setting 
CHAPTER ONE 
Literature Review 
1.1 Competence to Stand Trial (CST) 
 Evaluations of competence to stand trial (CST), also known as adjudicative 
competence, are the most commonly conducted forensic evaluations in the United States, 
with an estimated 60,000 conducted annually (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000). CST is a legal 
standard that was set forth by the United States Supreme Court decision known as Dusky 
v. United States (1960). There are two main criteria outlined in the decision that a 
defendant must meet in order to be declared competent. The first is that the defendant 
should have a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding” (Dusky v. United States, 1960, p. 402). The defendant 
must also have a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him” (Dusky v. United States, 1960, p. 402). The Dusky (1960) standard has been 
criticized for its vague language, as there is no universal understanding of the criteria nor 
a standardized tool for assessing competency (Cooper & Zapf, 2003; Otto, 2006). A 
common interpretation of the reference to “present ability” is that the evaluation of a 
defendant’s competency should be based on the defendant’s current abilities (Otto, 2006). 
Moreover, the abilities of the defendant should be considered in terms of the foreseeable 
demands of the defendant’s legal case (Otto, Musick, & Sherrod, 2010). The specification 
of “rational as well as factual understanding” has been interpreted to mean that 
competence related abilities are more than knowledge of legal facts; rather, a defendant 
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should be able to appreciate the nature of the charges and potential implications, and 
reason through the proceedings (Golding, Roesch, & Schrieber, 1984; Otto, 2006; Otto et 
al., 2010). A common interpretation consistent with the Dusky (1960) language of 
“reasonable degree of rational understanding,” is that in order to be declared CST, a 
defendant must be able to understand the legal proceedings and assist in his or her 
defense in the same way that an “average” defendant in the criminal justice system would 
be capable of (Golding et al., 1984). This means that a defendant with a diagnosed 
serious mental illness is not necessarily excluded from standing trial; rather, they would 
only be deemed incompetent to stand trial (IST) if their symptoms have a substantial 
impact on their present abilities to assist their defense attorney or their understanding of 
the nature of the proceedings (Golding et al., 1984; Otto, 2006; Tussey, Marcopulos, & 
Caillouet, 2013).   
CST is a critical legal standard, and is perhaps the most important area within the 
legal system to which mental health professionals contribute. Although courts more often 
than not agree with the opinion of the forensic evaluator (Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper, 
Wheeles, & Ronan, 2004), it is important to note that the concept of competency is 
strictly a legal standard. The final decision regarding a defendant’s competence is made 
by a legal decision maker. Mental health professionals who conduct CST evaluations 
simply provide an opinion regarding a defendant’s present competence related abilities 
(Otto, 2006). However, the opinion is an important one. Trying a defendant who does not 
meet the criteria as outlined by Dusky (1960) calls into question the reliability of the 
entire criminal justice system (Bonnie, 1992; Pirelli, Zapf, & Gottdiener, 2011). It would 
be a serious violation of the foundation of the criminal justice system and a defendant’s 
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civil rights to hold proceedings against a defendant who lacks basic understanding of the 
legal system, who cannot adequately assist his or her lawyer, or who is unable to 
appreciate the nature of the charges against him or her (Bonnie, 1992; Pirelli et al., 2011). 
In fact, to protect these rights, some states require higher standards than those outlined by 
the Dusky (1960) decision (Otto et al., 2010). Potential problems that could result from 
trying a defendant who lacks the necessary competence related abilities include a harsher 
sentence and denying the defendant needed treatment (Soliman & Resnick, 2010). On the 
other hand, it would also be unethical and a violation of human rights to commit a 
defendant to a psychiatric facility for competency restoration when the defendant is in 
fact competent (Pirelli et al., 2011). Due to the severe consequences of mislabeling a 
defendant, it is imperative that forensic evaluators can accurately assess adjudicative 
competency (Soliman & Resnick, 2010). 
 Several methods have been proposed for ensuring that forensic evaluations of 
competency are as accurate as possible. Early suggestions by Drob, Berger, and 
Weinstein (1987) included evaluating psychiatric symptoms, the effects of the symptoms 
on the defendant’s functional capabilities, and the defendant’s ability to participate in 
activities specifically relevant to legal proceedings. These areas of evaluation have been 
echoed more recently by Otto and colleagues (2010). Specifically, forensic evaluators 
must take into account identifiable symptoms of mental illness and how those symptoms 
or deficits impact a defendant’s competence-related abilities. Forensic evaluators may 
obtain collateral information from jail records, the defense attorney, or the defendant’s 
family members in order to build a more accurate picture of the defendant’s competence-
related abilities. Some forensic evaluators may also incorporate competence assessment 
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instruments into their evaluations (Otto et al., 2010). Otto and Heilbrun (2002) made a 
distinction between forensic assessment instruments and forensically-relevant 
instruments. These assessment tools differ in that forensic assessment instruments are 
related specifically to the legal standards of Dusky (1960) or other psycholegal domains 
(e.g., comprehension of Miranda rights), whereas forensically-relevant instruments are 
associated with broader abilities that are typically pertinent to adjudicative competency. 
Examples of forensically relevant instruments include instruments designed to detect 
malingering and response styles, violence risk assessments, and psychopathy checklists.  
1.2 Feigning 
 
One definition of feigning that has been commonly used in the literature is the 
deliberate exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms or deficits promoted by an external 
incentive (Franzen, Iverson, & McCracken, 1990; Iverson, 2006; Rogers, 1984; Slick, 
Sherman, & Iverson, 1999). Feigning often involves both exaggeration of psychological 
symptoms and underperformance on cognitive tests (Iverson, 2006). The term is also 
synonymous with terms such as malingering, faking, lying, simulating, exaggerating, or 
fraud (Iverson, 2006; LoPiccolo, Goodkin, & Baldewicz, 1999). Much emphasis has been 
placed on identifying the external incentive, or secondary gain, that serves as motivation 
in order to establish that malingering is occurring (Franzen et al.; LoPiccolo et al., 1999; 
1990; Slick et al., 1999). This is an important step in the detection of malingering because 
it distinguishes malingering from genuine disorders that have seemingly similar 
symptoms, such as factitious disorder, somatoform disorders, and dissociative disorders, 
which are associated with internal incentives (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
Iverson, 2006; LoPiccolo et al., 1999; Slick et al., 1999).  
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In order to better conceptualize malingering, scholars have proposed several 
models of malingering. Rogers (1984; 2008) characterized malingering as a possible 
response style that may occur in an evaluation or assessment. A response style describes 
how an examinee responds to items on a test; that is, it refers to some systematic way of 
responding that is independent of what the items on the test are designed to measure 
(Rogers, 1984; 2008). As a response style, feigning typically involves exaggeration of 
psychological symptoms or intentionally poor performance on cognitive tasks. Some 
examples of response styles indicative of feigning on tests related to psychological 
symptoms are reporting symptoms of extreme severity, over-endorsement of symptoms, 
and endorsement of rare or contradictory symptoms. Examples of response styles 
indicative of feigning on cognitive tests include grossly inaccurate responses on easy 
items or items related to general knowledge, poor performance that is significantly 
unlikely when compared to performance of reference groups, and performing poorly on 
items of a range of difficulty levels (Rogers, 1984; 2008). 
Rogers and colleagues described and provided evidence for two explanatory 
models of malingering: the pathogenic model and criminological model (Rogers, 1990b; 
Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998; Rogers, Sewell, & Goldstein, 
1994). The pathogenic model includes feigned symptoms of psychosis, while the 
criminological model refers to a motivation for malingering that stems from antisocial 
behaviors. The adaptational model was another conceptualization of feigned mental 
illness (Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983). Under this framework, an individual malingers 
because they perceive the evaluation or treatment as oppositional and think they have 
something to gain from malingering or something to lose from responding honestly 
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(Rogers, 1990b; Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983). A model based on classification of 
symptoms was also proposed by Rogers (1990a) to conceptualize malingering. He 
proposed classification based on endorsement of rare, indiscriminant, obvious, or 
improbable symptoms. Heinze and Purisch (2001) subsequently identified 6 different 
types of malingering: indiscriminant endorsement of symptoms, malingered mental 
illness, fabrication of neurocognitive deficits, fabrication of affective and cognitive 
symptoms, measure-dependent malingering, and unidentifiable approach. This model 
emphasizes various types of malingering and various symptoms or deficits one can 
malinger. 
Defendants undergoing CST evaluations may malinger either psychiatric 
symptoms or cognitive deficits in order to delay or avoid legal proceedings and possibly 
lengthy sentences or even the death penalty (Iverson & Binder, 2000). Defendants may 
also malinger for a myriad of other reasons: to obtain medication or better housing 
arrangements while being detained, or to provide a basis for a mental state defense (Otto 
et al., 2010). The prevalence of malingering in evaluations of adjudicative competency 
has been estimated to range from 8% to 21% (Cornell & Hawk, 1989; Mittenberg, Patton, 
Canyock, & Condit, 2002; Rogers et al., 1998; Vitacco, Rogers, Gabel, & Munizza, 
2007). The estimated rates have increased over the years, with the earliest rate of 8% 
estimated in 1989 by Cornell and Hawk (1989) and the most recent rate of 21% estimated 
in 2007 by Vitacco and colleagues (2007). This means that of the 60,000 defendants 
evaluated for competency annually (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000), approximately 12,000 of 
those defendants malingered.  
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1.3 Assessment of Feigning in CST Evaluations 
 
Failing to detect feigning may result in several negative outcomes, such as a 
patient or defendant receiving monetary awards they do not deserve, avoiding or delaying 
legal proceedings and possible sentences, or obtaining unjust worker’s compensation 
(Franzen et al., 1990; Iverson & Binder, 2000; Slick et al., 1999). For these reasons and 
the relatively high rates of feigning, it is necessary for forensic evaluators to have reliable 
and valid methods for detecting malingered symptoms or cognitive deficits. Slick and 
colleagues (1999) were the first to propose a set of specific criteria for clinicians to 
consider when “diagnosing” malingering. First, the presence of an external 
incentive/secondary gain must be established. Second, there should be some evidence in 
support of malingering from neuropsychological testing. This might include a negative 
response bias, which is defined as below-chance performance that indicates possible 
malingering. Other indicators might be discrepancies between test performance and 
patterns of known psychiatric or neurologic conditions, observed behavior, collateral 
interviews or reports, and documented history. Third, there should also be evidence from 
self-report measures that indicate a discrepancy between self-report history and 
documented history, or self-report symptoms and patterns of known disorders, 
observations, or information from collateral interviews or reports. It may also be obvious 
that the patient or defendant is exaggerating or fabricating symptoms, such endorsement 
of very rare manifestations of symptoms. Fourth, it should be established that the 
previous criteria are not fully explained by another condition (Slick et al., 1999). Other 
scholars have echoed these methods for detecting feigned incompetence or malingered 
symptoms. Specifically, obtaining the history of the patient or defendant in an interview 
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is important for assessing accuracy and any inconsistencies with documented history 
(Iverson & Binder, 2000; Singh, Avasthi, & Grover, 2007). Consistencies and 
inconsistencies in behavior should be examined and cross-referenced with documented 
history, collateral interviews and reports, and observed behavior in other settings or at 
other times (Singh et al., 2007; Soliman & Resnick, 2010). Finally, it is important to 
consider differential diagnoses, such as factitious disorder, which is associated with 
internal motivations (Iverson & Binder, 2000; Iverson, 2006; Singh et al., 2007). 
The detection of malingering is one area in which neuropsychology and forensic 
psychology tend to join forces. Neuropsychologists working in forensic settings are 
routinely involved in assessing various types of competencies, including competency to 
stand trial, and criminal responsibility (Denney & Wynkoop, 2000; Marcopulos, Morgan, 
& Denney, 2008; Tussey et al., 2013). Treatment teams of defendants committed to a 
psychiatric facility for competency restoration treatment may refer defendants for 
neuropsychological evaluations for several reasons. Neuropsychologists are trained to 
administer and interpret cognitive tests, and it can be helpful for treatment teams to learn 
more about the specific cognitive deficits that impact a particular defendant in order to 
better promote the defendant’s restoration to competency (Marcopulos et al., 2008). 
Neuropsychologists are also trained to administer tests specifically designed to detect 
suboptimal performance that may be indicative of malingering, so treatment teams may 
also refer out to neuropsychologists if they suspect that a defendant is malingering 
psychiatric symptoms or cognitive deficits (Denney & Wynkoop, 2000). A survey of 64 
forensic evaluators showed that 83% endorsed using such assessments in CST 
evaluations to gain more information about the cognitive functioning or suspected 
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malingering of a defendant (Lally, 2003), which suggests that the contribution of 
neuropsychological assessment is welcomed by forensic evaluators. Importantly, it has 
been argued that forensic evaluators and neuropsychologists who do not utilize 
neuropsychological malingering instruments in their examinations are not meeting the 
standards for the profession (Iverson, 2006; Peters, van Oorsouw, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach, 2013). 
 Neuropsychologists employ several methods for detecting poor effort, 
exaggeration, and malingering. Early on in the push for routine validity testing, Kirkish 
and Sreenivasan (1999) proposed two approaches for detection: (1) a qualitative analysis 
of test performance that involves comparing the individual’s performance to those with 
actual deficits, and (2) the use of specific instruments that are designed to detect feigned 
impairment. More recently, the quantitative (i.e., use of measures) approach has been 
encouraged to evaluate individual’s effort and response style when conducting 
assessments (Iverson & Binder, 2000; Larrabee, 2012). In fact, a major neuropsychology 
organization has encouraged the use of assessments designed to evaluate effort and 
response style as a way of confirming the validity of the test results (American Academy 
of Clinical Neuropsychology Board of Directors, 2007; Heilbronner, Sweet, Morgan, 
Larrabee, Millis & conference participants, 2009). Clinicians are encouraged to use more 
than one validity measure throughout an examination given that response bias fluctuates 
across a testing session. Additionally, it is best practice to base opinions regarding effort 
and response style on more than one measure (Boone, 2009; Iverson, 2006; Larrabee, 
2012).  
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Currently, there are two types of validity tests that are primarily used to evaluate 
feigning: performance validity tests (PVTs) and symptom validity tests (SVTs). PVTs are 
designed to evaluate the validity of an examinee’s actual ability to perform on a 
neuropsychological test and SVTs are designed to evaluate the accuracy of symptoms on 
self-report measures (Larrabee, 2012). Thus, PVTs are designed to detect response styles 
indicative of feigning on cognitive tests, including inaccurate responses on easy items or 
items related to general knowledge and below-chance performance. On the other hand, 
SVTs are designed to detect over-exaggeration of symptom severity, over-endorsement 
of symptoms, or endorsement of rare or contradictory symptoms; these are response 
patterns that are suggestive of feigning. The distinction between PVTs and SVTs is a 
relatively recent one that was made by Larrabee (2012) and was supported in a 
confirmatory factor analysis conducted by Van Dyke, Millis, Axelrod, and Hanks (2013) 
who found distinct factors for cognitive performance tests, PVTs, and self-report 
measures (including standard measures and SVTs). Further, a person’s failure on a PVT 
does not necessarily imply failure on a SVT; that is, an individual can feign cognitive 
deficits, psychiatric symptoms, or both. 
In order to understand how neuropsychological validity tests work, the concept of 
effort must first be discussed. Schretlen and DeRight (2016) defined effort as exercising 
physical or psychological capacities. That is, the clinician should consider if the 
examinee is trying hard on a test or just passing some minimal standard on a validity test. 
Effort can be thought of as a normal distribution that represents a continuum ranging 
from excellent to very poor (Larrabee, 2012; Schretlen & DeRight, 2016). This idea 
implies that there are individual differences in how people try on cognitive tests, although 
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the mechanism that would explain these differences is unknown. Moreover, about 2.5% 
of people will show abnormally low effort on cognitive tests for reasons evaluators can 
only make inferences about (Schretlen & DeRight, 2016). Passing a validity test does not 
necessarily mean that an examinee put forth his or her best or full effort; rather, it simply 
means that they put forth adequate effort (Iverson, 2006). Failing a validity test typically 
means that an examinee scored below a certain cut off score, and so their performance is 
considered to be invalid and not reflective of their true ability (for PVTs) or symptoms 
(for SVTs). If an examinee fails a validity test, it indicates that they were either putting 
forth low effort (that is, the examinee is not at all invested) or putting in a large amount 
of effort in order to fail the test (i.e., malingering). That is, malingering, which requires 
deliberate production or exaggeration of deficits, actually requires a large amount of 
effort (Marcopulos, Caillouet, Bailey, Kent, & Frederick, 2014; Schretlen & DeRight, 
2016). This result would call into question the validity of all of the defendant’s test 
results (Denney & Wynkoop, 2000; Larrabee, 2012). Validity testing is an important step 
to take in neuropsychological assessments, because the conclusions that would be made 
from test data from a defendant who was putting in suboptimal effort or malingering 
would be grossly inaccurate; that is, they would score lower on the tests and thus appear 
more impaired than they really are (Larrabee, 2012; Marcopulos et al., 2014). The 
effectiveness of validity tests was shown in a meta-analysis that examined 32 studies of 
common malingering tests (Vickery, Berry, Inman, Harris, & Orey, 2001); the 
researchers found a 95.7% specificity rate across all tests and samples for detecting 
feigned responding. Also, the use of routine validity testing is highlighted by the fact that 
in a survey of 805 neuropsychologists with some forensic practice, 80.1% reported using 
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multiple embedded validity tests in their assessments and 73.5% indicated that they used 
multiple stand-alone validity tests (Sweet, Benson, Nelson, & Moberg, 2015). In a similar 
survey, 98.7% of 316 neuropsychologists rated the use of validity tests in a forensic 
setting as mandatory, and 88.9% agreed or strongly agreed that validity testing provides 
more accurate results regarding credibility than clinical impressions and observations 
(Martin, Schroeder, & Odland, 2015). 
Validity tests have been employed in the detection of malingering in defendants 
undergoing CST evaluations (e.g., Green, Rosenfeld, Belfi, Rohlehr, & Pierson, 2012; 
Gothard, Vigilione, Meloy, & Sherman, 1995). These measures can be incredibly useful 
when assessing defendants, given the obvious secondary gain associated with poor 
performance on cognitive tests (Marcopulos et al., 2014). Validity tests are particularly 
useful in forensic settings for evaluating the possibility of malingering because they 
require minimal effort to reach a passing score (Schretlen & DeRight, 2016). As 
discussed previously, there are two main reasons for failing a validity test: low effort and 
malingering. When malingering is likely (i.e., when the examinee has some external 
incentive to seem impaired, such as legal charges), poor performance on a validity test is 
likely due to deliberate production or exaggeration of deficits (Larrabee, 2012).  
There is emerging evidence for a more direct approach to feigning incompetence 
to stand trial (IST) rather than production or exaggeration of cognitive deficits or 
symptoms: feigned lack of knowledge about the legal system. That is, defendants may 
not malinger symptoms of psychosis or severe cognitive deficits, but rather fake having 
little knowledge of the legal system. Defendants who take this approach may think that 
they can show that they have too little knowledge to continue with their legal proceedings 
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and be deemed IST because of that lack of knowledge. Recently, an instrument was 
developed to address this approach to feigning incompetence: the Inventory of Legal 
Knowledge (Musick & Otto, 2010). 
1.4 Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK) 
 
 Two forensic psychologists developed the Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK) 
to address a need they saw in their own forensic evaluation practices for an assessment 
tool that detects feigned lack of legal knowledge in CST evaluations (Musick & Otto, 
2010; Otto et al., 2010). The ILK consists of 61 questions about the legal system, all of 
which are true or false. See Table 1 for sample items. One point is given for each correct 
response, and lower total scores are thought to represent higher levels of feigning. The 
ILK was designed to be administered to English-speaking individuals ages 12 and over 
who are undergoing CST evaluations. The purpose of the ILK is to help a forensic 
evaluator assess a defendant’s response style to questions about the legal system. The test 
authors explicitly stated in the test manual that, contrary to the test’s name, the ILK is not 
a test of a defendant’s competence or even their legal knowledge. Rather, it is an 
instrument designed to assess a defendant’s response style to questions that evaluate his 
or her legal knowledge (Otto et al., 2010). Rogers (1984; 2008) identified feigning as a 
response style; that is, individuals who are feigning on cognitive tests are likely to 
incorrectly answer very easy items or items related to general knowledge, perform poorly 
on items across a range of difficulty levels, and perform significantly below chance when 
compared to performance of reference groups. Thus, it follows that evaluating a 
defendant’s response style might help a forensic evaluator glean information about 
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whether the defendant is likely feigning a lack of knowledge about the legal system in 
order to appear impaired enough to be deemed IST (Otto et al., 2010).  
The ILK is a type of PVT called a forced choice test (FCT). Generally, this 
method involves evaluating response styles by presenting an individual with a two 
options, one correct and one incorrect. Based on probability theory, an individual is 
expected to respond correctly about 50% of the time when only two response options are 
presented (Binder & Pankratz, 1987; Frederick & Speed, 2007; Guilmette, Hart, & 
Giuliano, 1993; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989; Otto et al., 2010; Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 
1975). Poor performance on a FCT does not necessarily mean that an individual is 
malingering, given that factors other than intended response style also influence scores on 
FCTs (i.e., effort, abilities, and guessing; Frederick & Speed, 2007). However, the idea 
behind FCTs is that, at worst, even an individual who is severely impaired and/or lacks 
any knowledge of the legal system would be able to perform at chance level (i.e., get 
50% correct). There are few other explanations for a score significantly below chance 
(i.e., below 50%) other than that the individual is malingering. In fact, Hiscock and 
Hiscock (1989) pointed out that in order to obtain a score below 50% on a FCT, the 
individual must have the cognitive capacity to also be able to obtain a score significantly 
above chance. Frederick and Speed (2007) stated that two factors contribute to below 
chance scores: random responding and malingering. Thus, if secondary gain can also be 
identified, below chance scores provide strong evidence that the individual deliberately 
obtained a low score, presumably to appear more impaired then he or she truly is 
(Frederick & Speed, 2007; Guilmette et al., 1993; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989; Otto et al., 
2010). 
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The ILK employs the below-chance method to detect feigned legal knowledge by 
presenting defendants with statements related to the legal system. The defendants are 
asked to identify if the statement is true or false. Given that there are only two response 
options, the probability theory that is the foundation of the below-chance method applies. 
That is, defendants are expected to provide correct responses on at least 50% of the items 
(i.e., chance level). Other established validity measures employ the below-chance method 
(e.g., the Test of Memory Malingering; Tombaugh, 1996), but the items on these 
measures are so easy that even a severely impaired person can correctly answer the vast 
majority of them. The items on the ILK have not been systematically tested to determine 
if they meet this criterion; rather, it seems the test authors simply assumed that the items 
would meet the criterion because experts opined that they were written with simple 
terminology and sentence structure (Otto et al., 2010; Rogers, Robinson, & Henry, 2015). 
The below-chance approach is only one way that the ILK detects possible 
feigning. The second way is called the floor effect, which involves comparing 
defendants’ scores with average scores from various reference samples, such as criminal 
defendants acquitted by reason of insanity or adult inpatients with serious mental 
illnesses. The idea is that a defendant is likely feigning if they score significantly below 
the average of the appropriate (i.e., most similar) reference group (Flanagan & Jenkins, 
2014; Otto et al., 2010). The floor effect approach generally has better sensitivity than the 
below-chance approach. This is because the below-chance method only detects extreme 
feigning, and typically only identifies about 25% of feigners (Otto et al., 2010). 
 Reviewers of the ILK have pointed out some of the instrument’s favorable 
qualities. Recently, a review was conducted to evaluate the status of the research on CST 
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over the last 10 years (Fogel, Schiffman, Mumley, Tillbrook, & Grisso, 2013). In the 
review, three new adjudicative competency assessment instruments were discussed, 
including the ILK. Fogel and colleagues (2013) mentioned a unique quality about these 
new instruments: they were all designed to examine potential feigned IST, which had not 
been the focus of any prior measurement tools used by forensic evaluators. Other 
reviewers have also highlighted the uniqueness of the ILK, as well as its other positive 
attributes. In a Mental Measurement Yearbook review of the ILK, Flanagan and Jenkins 
(2014) stated that the ILK seemed to be a useful tool for assessing response styles in 
forensic evaluations, given that there is evidence of internal reliability and convergent 
validity and that the cut score has adequate sensitivity (ability to correctly detect true 
positives; Streiner & Cairney, 2007) and specificity (ability to correctly detect true 
negatives; Streiner & Cairney, 2007). Moreover, the ILK is relatively easy to administer 
and could easily be used by forensic evaluators during their evaluations of defendants. 
The reviewers did, however, caution against using the ILK as the sole method of 
assessing response style (Flanagan & Jenkins, 2014). 
 The ILK has also received some criticism and concerns. In a review of 
instruments used in CST evaluations, Acklin (2012) raised the concern that the ILK is a 
limited measure in that it focuses solely on feigning a lack of legal knowledge. Moreover, 
Acklin (2012) argued that a defendant possessing low levels of legal knowledge does not 
necessarily mean that he or she is not competent to proceed in trial. Therefore, the ILK 
may not be a very useful instrument for forensic evaluators whose primary concern is 
determining if the defendant is competent. These concerns were echoed and elaborated 
on by Rubenzer (2011). One issue Rubenzer (2011) had with the ILK was that defendants 
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who are going to feign incompetence typically do not feign only a lack of legal 
knowledge; rather, they would feign a myriad of deficits (such as cognitive deficits, 
psychiatric symptoms, and/or intellectual disability) in an attempt to increase their 
chances of avoiding trial. Therefore, the ILK simply may not be a necessary instrument, 
as these malingering strategies are able to be detected by existing measures. Rubenzer 
(2011) also expressed several concerns with the test development process. He argued that 
the ILK showed only moderate ability to detect feigned responses and honest responses 
from defendants at the time they are undergoing their competency evaluation, which is 
when the ILK would be administered in practice. Rubenzer (2011) also pointed out that 
the authors of the ILK did not examine the test’s factor structure; this would have been 
important for them to assess so that they can be confident that all items of the test are 
measuring the same construct (that is, response style to questions about legal knowledge). 
It would only be appropriate to report one total score if the test is, in fact, unidimensional. 
He also highlighted the lack of information about how the ILK performs for defendants 
with low intelligence levels, which is extremely prevalent in forensic populations for 
which the ILK is intended (Rubenzer, 2011). Indeed, research has suggested that 
defendants of varying levels of intelligence perform differently on the ILK (Gottfried & 
Carbonell, 2014).  
There has been some debate regarding the use of the ILK as a validity measure. 
Rubenzer (2011) asserted that the ILK may be better as a tool for assessing a defendant’s 
level of knowledge about the legal system, rather than for detecting response style. 
However, this is the exact opposite purpose for which the test authors intended the ILK 
(Otto et al., 2010). This concern was echoed by Rogers and colleagues (2015), who 
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pointed out that the individual items have yet to be rigorously tested to determine if they 
meet the criteria for the below-chance method (i.e., if they are easy enough that a person 
with no legal knowledge could answer a majority of the items). Rubenzer (2011) also 
disagreed with the use of the recommended cut score of 47. He argued that it is 
completely reasonable for those who are incompetent and/or lack legal knowledge to 
score well below 47; in fact, the average for this reference group (n = 17) was 40.59 (SD 
= 8.53, range = 29 to 55) and 82% of the sample scored at or below 47 (Otto et al., 2010). 
That is, 82% of defendants in the incompetent sample were classified as possible 
feigners. However, it is equally possible that these defendants were simply too impaired 
or did not have the necessary legal knowledge to correctly answer more than an average 
of 47 items. This is quite troubling, as it contradicts the interpretation of the ILK total 
score as a measure of likelihood of feigning rather than as a measure of legal knowledge. 
In sum, critics of the ILK called for more empirical research on the ILK before 
forensic evaluators regularly use it. In general, it has been suggested that all instruments 
used in forensic evaluations should have empirical research supporting their reliability 
and validity (Fogel et al., 2013; Iverson, 2006; Otto & Heilbrun, 2002; Pirelli et al., 
2011). Selecting assessment tools with sound reliability and validity evidence is vital to 
ensuring that the conclusions that are made from the data produced by the instruments are 
accurate. In fact, Iverson (2006) argued that it is an ethical violation for clinicians to fail 
to use well-researched validity measures. Researchers who have conducted studies 
specifically on the ILK have highlighted the importance of determining the validity and 
reliability of the ILK prior to its widespread use in CST evaluations, where the stakes are 
high for correctly labeling a defendant as competent, incompetent, honest, or feigning 
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(Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014; Gottfried Hudson, Vitacco, & Carbonell, 2015; Guenther 
& Otto, 2010). Given the paucity of research examining the psychometric properties of 
the ILK and debate surrounding its use as a validity test, I attempted to contribute to the 
test’s development by exploring its psychometric properties and examining its 
performance in a sample of forensically-committed and civilly-committed psychiatric 
inpatients. 
  





To examine performance of inpatients on the ILK, I evaluated total scores in 
relation to reference groups, as well as item-level performance to determine if there were 
any items on the test that were particularly difficult for the sample. I also examined 
differences in ILK performance in terms of the total score and at the item level between 
forensic and civil patients, and competent and incompetent defendants1. The range of 
possible scores on the ILK is 0 to 61, with lower scores thought to represent higher levels 
of feigning. A score of 47 or below is thought to be suggestive of feigning. Otto and 
colleagues (2010) administered the ILK to reference groups consisting of civil patients, 
forensic patients, competent defendants, and incompetent defendants. Civil patients 
obtained an average total score of 53 and forensic patients obtained an average score of 
50 (Otto et al., 2010). Competent defendants correctly answered, on average, 50 of the 
items, while incompetent defendants obtained an average total score of 40 (Otto et al., 
2010). I expected to see similar results from the current sample. 
I was particularly interested in identifying items that tended to be difficult for the 
participants because such items would likely not be effective for discriminating between 
feigners and honest responders. That is, even examinees responding honestly would be 
likely to incorrectly answer very difficult items. An incorrect answer on difficult items 
                                                          
1 Civil patients are usually those who are committed to the hospital because they are believed to be 
dangerous to self or others. Forensic patients are those who are committed to the hospital for legal issues, 
typically competency to stand trial restoration treatment and/or to undergo forensic mental health 
evaluations. Competent defendants are those who, after a period of competency restoration treatment, are 
opined by the forensic evaluator to be competent to stand trial. Incompetent defendants are those who were 
opined not to be competent to stand trial, and may undergo additional restoration treatment or be committed 
to a long-term psychiatric facility. 
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would lower an honest responding examinee’s total score, which may make it seem like 
they are feigning a lack of legal knowledge when, in fact, they simply do not know the 
answer to the item. This would defeat the purpose of the ILK as a validity test that is 
designed to be easy enough that even an impaired person would be able to get many of 
the items, if not all, correct. Item 20, which is related to attorney-client confidentiality, 
has performed poorly across a range of intelligence levels (Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014), 
and so was hypothesized to perform poorly in the current sample. This item may be a 
poorly written item, but the researchers did not provide a possible reason for its poor 
performance. I took into consideration that on some difficult items, especially those with 
many clauses, some feigners may think they were incorrectly responding but actually 
correctly answered the item. 
I attempted to further the knowledge of the psychometric properties of the ILK in 
an inpatient psychiatric sample by examining reliability information. Few studies have 
obtained internal reliability measures using an inpatient sample (Gottfried et al., 2015; 
Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010), but the estimates of coefficient alpha have 
ranged from .88 (Otto et al., 2010) to .94 (Gottfried et al., 2015). Therefore, I 
hypothesized that the internal reliability estimates would fall in that range. 
I also evaluated construct validity of the ILK to address the concerns of Rubenzer 
(2011) and Rogers and colleagues (2015) regarding the utility of the instrument as a 
validity measure that employs the below-chance approach for detecting feigning. This is 
a serious issue given that low ILK scores are taken to be indicative of feigning rather than 
just a lack of knowledge about the legal system. It could be that, in the current sample, 
the instrument functioned more like a test of legal knowledge than a validity measure. 
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Preliminary support has been shown for the ILK’s construct validity in terms of it being 
able to discriminate between samples asked to simulate feigned incompetence and those 
asked to respond honestly (Gottfried et al., 2015; Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 
2010; Rogers et al., 2015); however, the dataset used for this study did not contain a 
variable that differentiated known feigners and known honest responders. Instead, I 
examined performance on the ILK of the entire sample, as well as the four sub-groups: 
civil patients, forensic patients, competent defendants, and incompetent defendants. 
Forensic patients were used as a proxy for defendants feigning incompetence given that 
this group had more of an incentive to feign incompetence than civil patients.  
If the ILK functioned as a validity test in the sample, I expected that it would 
correlate negatively with a variable representing secondary gain (that is, an external 
incentive to feign) associated with legal charges. Similarly, those with legal charges 
(forensic patients) were expected to obtain lower ILK total scores than those without 
legal charges (civil patients). These findings would suggest that there was a relationship 
between likelihood to feign incompetence (indicated by presence of secondary 
gain/forensic status) and low ILK score, thus supporting its use as a validity measure. I 
expected the range of scores for the entire sample to be condensed above the highest cut 
off score that indicates possible feigning (i.e., most participants correctly answered 48 or 
more of the items). I expected any participants who scored in the below-chance region to 
be forensic patients who have secondary gain in the form of legal charges. In addition, 
based on previous research showing that incompetent defendants scored an average of 
about 40 on the ILK, I expected defendants declared incompetent to score in the below-
chance region. Moreover, the distribution of total scores was expected to differ for 
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forensic patients and the entire sample; specifically, more forensic participants than civil 
were expected to score at or below 47, which is the highest cut off score indicative of 
feigning. Additionally, I attempted to establish if there was convergent validity between 
the ILK and the Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT), a widely used performance validity 
measure. I expected only a moderate correlation such as that found in a prior validity 
study by Otto and colleagues (2011; r = .67) due to the fact that the RFIT is a measure of 
cognitive effort. RFIT scores for individuals who were feigning psychiatric symptoms 
and/or incompetence, but not cognitive deficits, likely would not correlate highly with the 
ILK. However, even a moderate correlation between the validity measures would provide 
support for interpretation of the ILK as a validity test rather than a test of legal 
knowledge. 
If, on the other hand, the instrument functioned as a test of legal knowledge in this 
sample, I expected that the instrument would have a weak a relationship with secondary 
gain, and there would be no significant or practical difference between the average total 
score of forensic and civil patients. This would suggest that there was no relationship 
between likelihood to feign incompetence and ILK score. In addition, the range of scores 
for the entire sample, forensic patients, and civil patients would create a normal 
distribution that represents level of legal knowledge as a continuum that ranges from 
excellent to poor and varies across the population. Defendants opined to be incompetent 
were expected to score on the lower end of the range, while those opined to be competent 
were expected to score on the higher end. I also expected the instrument to have a weak 
correlation with the RFIT, an established validity measure. 
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I was also interested in examining how ILK performance differed between those 
defendants declared competent and incompetent. Otto and colleagues (2010) found that 
incompetent defendants (M = 40.59, SD = 8.53, range = 29 to 55) had a significantly 
lower total ILK score than competent defendants (M = 50.41, SD = 6.85, range = 34 to 
60), so I expected a similar result. However, this result might support interpretation of the 
ILK as a test of legal knowledge. Incompetent defendants are typically very impaired 
and/or lack some fundamental understanding of the nature of legal process, so such a 
result would suggest that performance might depend on level of impairment and/or level 
of legal knowledge. Thus, a significant difference between incompetent and competent 
defendants would suggest that not even those who are very impaired or those with low 
levels of legal knowledge can obtain a total score above 47, the highest cut off score that 
is suggestive of feigning. This would be problematic because even severely impaired 
people can perform very well on most other established validity measures (e.g., Test of 
Memory Malingering, Tombaugh, 1996) and it would contradict the test authors’ claim 
that the ILK is a validity measure. 
There has been no prior research on the nature of the relationship between 
demographic, clinical, and legal variables and ILK total score. I was interested in 
examining the relationship between ILK total scores and a myriad of clinical and 
demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, race, diagnosis, current symptoms, age of 
illness onset, duration of illness, and education), as well as legal variables (e.g., prior 
history of incarceration, prior offenses). I also attempted to determine if there was a 
relationship between performance on a measure of verbal intelligence and performance 
on the ILK. This was important to evaluate because it would not be desirable for 
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individuals with low intelligence to be classified as possible feigners (i.e., correctly 
answer 47 or fewer items) if they are responding to the best of their ability. A prior study 
found that intelligence mediated ILK performance in a sample of inpatients (r = .47; 
Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014); I expected a similar result. 
  




Description of Measurement and Methods 
The current study utilized archival data obtained at Western State Hospital, a 
psychiatric inpatient hospital located in Staunton, Virginia. The sample contained 17 
forensically-committed psychiatric inpatients and 23 civilly-committed psychiatric 
inpatients for a total sample of 40 participants. Participants were age 18 and older with a 
variety of races, diagnoses, durations of illness, ages of illness onset, and education 
levels. Demographic information will be discussed in greater detail in the Results section. 
Data were collected between August 9th, 2016 and December 15th, 2016. The 
study was approved by the hospital’s Institutional Review Board prior to data collection. 
Patients were asked to participate in the study only if they had the capacity to consent to 
medical care and if they had been admitted to the hospital within 30 days. That is, the 
research team only approached patients who were capable of providing consent for 
medical treatment, and by extension, were assumed to be able to provide consent for 
participation in a research study. 
A board certified clinical neuropsychologist, psychometrician, or trained graduate 
student administered the tests to the participants. Participants were offered a consent 
form, which they agreed to sign before participating in the study. They did not receive 
any direct benefits for participation, such as monetary rewards. The battery included the 
ILK, Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT), Wide Range Achievement Test-Version 4 (WRAT-4) 
word reading subtest, and the Personality Assessment Screener (PAS). The tests were 
administered in the following order: RFIT, WRAT, ILK, and PAS. The battery took 
approximately half an hour to administer. To obtain demographic information, a research 
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team member reviewed patients’ electronic medical records. Demographic information 
was then checked and confirmed by another member of the research team. No identifying 
information was kept with testing records. 
Given that the test data were gathered as part of a clinical research study in order 
to determine if the ILK was useful for the population at the hospital, I extended the 
project for this thesis by obtaining the competence decisions and legal information for the 
forensically-committed patients. I obtained this information for as many participants as 
possible by reviewing public records on the official website for the Virginia Judicial 
System, contacting court clerks, and contacting the Office of Forensic Services within the 
Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services. This information 
enabled me to make comparisons between not just forensic and civil participants, but also 
between competent and incompetent individuals. 
3.1 Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK) 
  
There are 61 items on the ILK, all of which are true or false items with content 
about various concepts or terms related to the United States criminal justice system. 
Specifically, the items are about charges, pleas, defendants’ rights, and roles and 
proceedings in the courtroom. See Table 1 for sample items. The test authors’ (Musick & 
Otto, 2010) own experiences with conducting CST evaluations and their knowledge of 
the criminal justice system informed the construction of the items. They initially came up 
with 100 items that were reviewed by a panel of five psychologists, one psychiatrist, two 
attorneys, and a clergy member. The 61 items that were selected were believed to have no 
gender, race, or ethnic biases. Items were revised to ensure that the language was clear 
and succinct. The items have an average reading level of 10th grade or lower, and the 
INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE                                                                     28  
 
 
overall reading level for the ILK is 5th grade. The test authors recommend administering 
the ILK only to examinees who have at least a 5th grade reading level. About half of the 
items have correct answers of “true” (n = 31), while the other half have correct answers 
of “false” (n = 30).  The 61 items were also piloted to evaluate how well the ILK 
differentiated between feigned and honest responding, and to test the language of the 
items. Following the pilot studies, only slight revisions were made to some of the items 
(Otto et al., 2010). 
An examiner administers the test by reading each item aloud and circling the 
examinee’s response (either true or false) on a response sheet. The examiner also 
provides feedback to the defendant about whether their response is correct or not. The 
test authors allowed for this feedback process to allow defendants who genuinely lack 
legal knowledge to learn about the system and potentially improve their performance on 
the rest of the test. Moreover, the feedback may encourage defendants who are actually 
feigning to perform even worse on the test if they think they are responding correctly too 
often. Typically, the ILK takes 15 minutes to administer and can be administered in a 
myriad of settings (e.g., jails, psychiatric hospitals, forensic evaluation clinics; Otto et al., 
2010).  
One point is given for each correct response and the number of correct responses 
is summed to produce a total score, so the range of possible total scores is 0 to 61. As 
discussed previously, the ILK employs the below-chance approach to identify feigners. 
That is, if a defendant scores below a specified score, it is likely that the defendant is 
feigning a lack of legal knowledge. Scores between 37 and 47 are suggestive of feigning, 
but are slightly above chance level. Scores between 24 and 36 are considered to be at 
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chance level. A score of 23 or lower is considered below-chance responding and thus is 
strongly suggestive of a feigned response style (Otto et al., 2010). The test authors also 
recommend interpreting ILK total scores in context. That is, a defendant’s score should 
be considered not only in reference to below-chance responding, but also to the most 
similar reference group (Otto et al., 2010). 
3.1.1 Reliability evidence. Otto and colleagues (2010) collected initial internal 
reliability evidence when developing the ILK. The control sample consisted of adults, 
college students, and adolescents (N = 615). The clinical/forensic sample consisted of 
adult psychiatric inpatients, adults declared IST, adults acquitted by reason of insanity, 
adult defendants undergoing CST evaluations, juvenile defendants undergoing CST 
evaluations, and juveniles declared IST (N = 515). Coefficient alpha for the total score 
was .88, which suggests that the ILK has good internal consistency. That is, it is likely 
that all items on the test assess the same construct. However, the average item-total 
correlation was quite low at .32 (range = .10 to .53) for the adult control sample (n = 
211), which indicates that not all of the items were measuring the same construct for this 
sample. 
 Reliability evidence was also collected from samples of psychiatric inpatients (n = 
100) and college students (n = 207). Coefficient alpha for college students and psychiatric 
inpatients was .66 and .91, respectively. The ILK was administered twice to the college 
students within five to 11 days (M = 7.1). The test-retest reliability was adequate at .76 
(Guenther & Otto, 2010). Gottfried and colleagues (2015) also obtained reliability 
evidence from 195 college students and 130 psychiatric patients who were declared IST. 
The college students were asked to either simulate feigned mental illness or lack of legal 
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knowledge. Coefficient alpha was high for both groups: .97 for college students and .94 
for psychiatric inpatients (Gottfried et al., 2015). Taken together, the findings of these 
two studies show initial support for the internal and test-retest reliability of the ILK. 
3.1.2 Validity evidence. The ability of the ILK to distinguish feigners and non-
feigners was examined using the control and clinical/forensic groups from which the 
initial reliability evidence was derived (Otto et al., 2010). This type of validity evidence 
evaluates the degree to which a measure can separate two groups; in the case of the ILK, 
the focus is on if it can separate feigners and honest responders. Guenther and Otto 
(2010) asked samples of college students and inpatients to respond honestly and feign a 
lack of legal knowledge (“fake bad”). College students in the honest condition (M = 
55.37, SD = 3.54, range = 45 to 61) obtained significantly higher total scores on the ILK 
than those in the fake bad condition (M = 38.46, SD = 8.40, range = 10 to 58) [F(1, 206 = 
416.46, p < .001]. Similarly, patients who were asked to respond honestly (M = 55.04, SD 
= 7.59, range = 29 to 61) also obtained significantly higher total scores than patients in 
the fake bad condition (M = 36.24, SD = 12.75, range = 7 to 57) [F(1, 99 = 64.14, p < 
.001]. This finding provides initial support for the ILK being able to distinguish between 
feigned and genuine responding (Guenther & Otto, 2010). 
 Performance of the ILK among jail detainees was also examined by Rogers et al. 
(2015) across three versions of the ILK: Total ILK that was comprised of all 61 items, R-
ILK-90 that consisted of 40 items, and R-ILK-95 that was comprised of 28 items. Across 
all versions, there were significant differences and large effect sizes between detainees 
asked to respond honestly and those asked to feign a lack of legal knowledge. This 
provides support for the ILK being able to distinguish between feigned and genuine 
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responding, which is what it is designed to do. In a similar study, Gottfried and 
colleagues (2015) asked a sample of 195 college students to respond honestly, simulate 
symptoms of mental illness, or simulate IST. The participants were evenly distributed 
into each group (n = 65). As expected, the honest responders scored higher (M = 55.14, 
SD = 4.92, range = 31 to 61) than both those who feigned mental illness (M = 45.29, SD 
= 14.03, range = 15 to 59) and those who feigned IST (M = 34.55, SD = 16.08, range = 3 
to 60). A sample of 130 psychiatric inpatients was divided evenly into an honest and 
suspected feigning group. The honest responders scored significantly higher (M = 53, SD 
= 6.56, range = 31 to 61) than the suspected feigners (M = 42.11, SD = 12.02, range = 10 
to 61). These results, taken together with those of Rogers and colleagues (2015), provide 
further support for the function of the ILK as a measure for detecting feigned responding 
when used in controlled, known-groups studies. 
 The convergent validity of the ILK has also been examined by correlating ILK 
scores with scores from other PVT measures (Otto, Musick, & Sherrod, 2011). 
Convergent validity, a type of construct validity, refers to the degree to which a test is 
designed to measure what it is supposed to measure by correlating scores from the test of 
interest with scores from well-established tests of a similar construct. The ILK scores 
were moderately correlated with scores from the Rey Fifteen Item Test (r = .67), the 
Reliable Digit Span Test (r = .63), and the Test of Memory Malingering Trial 2 (r = .60). 
These tests are primarily designed to detect malingering of cognitive and/or memory 
deficits, which may explain why the correlations with the ILK, which is designed to 
detect feigned lack of legal knowledge, are only moderate. These moderate correlations 
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provide some support for the utility of the ILK as a validity measure, rather than a test of 
legal knowledge. 
3.1.3 Classification accuracy and utility as a validity test. Beyond obtaining 
validity evidence, another way that the test authors and other researchers have attempted 
to ascertain how the ILK functions in identifying feigners is by examining classification 
accuracy statistics. Otto and colleagues (2010) used data from a sample of college 
students (n = 207), community psychiatric inpatients (n = 100), and defendants acquitted 
by reason of insanity (n = 99). They employed a simulation/known groups design in 
which half of each sample was asked to fake bad and the other half was asked to respond 
honestly. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was used to evaluate the 
classification utility of the ILK. A cut score of 47 showed the best specificity and 
sensitivity rates across three samples: college student control sample (.84 and .99, 
respectively), community psychiatric inpatients (.76 and .82, respectively), and insanity 
acquittees (.77 and .77, respectively). Sensitivity refers to the ability of a test to detect 
true positives, or if the test can correctly identify people with the disorder of interest as 
having the disorder (Larrabee, 2012; Streiner & Cairney, 2007). For example, sensitivity 
of the ILK refers to how well the instrument detects defendants who are actually 
feigning. Specificity, on the other hand, refers to the ability of a test to correctly identify 
true negatives; in other words, if the test can accurately identify a person without the 
disorder of interest as not having the disorder (Larrabee, 2012; Streiner & Cairney, 2007). 
In the case of the ILK, it refers to the ability of the measure to classify defendants who 
are truly responding honestly as not feigning. The ILK currently, on average, has higher 
sensitivity than specificity. However, some scholars have suggested that it is acceptable 
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for malingering measures to have low sensitivity as long as the test’s specificity is high. 
That is, it is acceptable to not detect some malingerers, as long as when a malingerer is 
detected, clinicians can be fairly confident that the person is actually malingering 
(Reznek, 2005). It could be argued that more focus should be placed on maximizing the 
specificity of the ILK. 
 Across the three groups, the positive predictive power (PPP) ranged from .72 to 
.98 and the negative predictive power (NPP) ranged from .77 to .81 (Guenther & Otto, 
2010; Otto et al., 2010). PPP and NPP differ from sensitivity and specificity in that they 
are proportions. PPP refers to the percentage of individuals who a test accurately 
identifies as having the condition of interest; on the other hand, NPP is the percentage of 
individuals who the test classifies as not having the condition who truly do not have the 
condition of interest (Parikh, Mathai, Parikh, Sekhar, & Thomas, 2008). Thus, the 
percentage of individuals correctly classified as malingering ranged from 72% to 98%, 
and the percentage of individuals correctly classified as not malingering ranged from 
77% to 81%. Area under the curve (AUC) values were also been calculated for three of 
the reference samples (Otto et al., 2010). These values represent the probability that 
anyone feigning IST will obtain a lower total score than anyone who is not feigning. The 
AUC values were large for the college student sample, community psychiatric inpatient 
sample, and insanity acquittee sample (.97, .90, and .86, respectively).  
More recently, cut scores have been examined in a sample of jail detainees also 
with the use of an ROC curve (Rogers et al., 2015). This studied examined three versions 
of the ILK: the total ILK that consisted of all 61 items, the R-ILK-90 that consisted of 40 
items that 90% of the sample correctly answered, and the R-ILK-95 that consisted of 28 
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items that 95% of the sample correctly answered. Using the suggested cut score of 47 that 
indicates “suggestive feigning,” the sensitivity and specificity of the Total ILK were .96 
and .89, respectively. Also, there was 92% correct classification accuracy. The R-ILK-90 
and R-ILK-95 performed well, with classification accuracy rates of 96% using a cut score 
of 33 and 99% using a cut score of 25, respectively (Rogers et al., 2015). These results 
suggest that shorter versions of the instrument that contain only items that the vast 
majority of a given sample correctly answered may perform better than the current 
version of the ILK. 
The range of ILK total scores can also be used to examine the instrument’s utility 
as a validity test. If the ILK is a validity measure, the range of total scores for any sample 
should be condensed to above 50% given that, according to the below-chance approach, a 
defendant with no legal knowledge should be able to correctly answer about half of the 
items. Those who obtain scores below the 50% cut off score should only be individuals 
with secondary gain. However, the lowest score for all reference groups was below 47, 
the highest recommended cut score. The lowest score for all groups, except the known 
malingering group, fell slightly above (range = 37 to 46) or within the range of chance 
level (24 to 36; Otto et al., 2010). That is, some people who responded honestly were 
considered to be possible feigners; however, these people may have just not known 
enough about the legal system to obtain a total score beyond the range indicative of 
feigning (> 47). This reiterates the point made by Rubenzer (2011) that it is reasonable 
for defendants who are incompetent and/or lack legal knowledge to correctly answer 
fewer than 47 of the 61 items. In sum, although the classification accuracy statistics 
associated with the ILK in various samples during simulation/known groups designs are 
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quite good, they still do not eliminate the possible explanation of a low ILK score as 
being indicative of low legal knowledge rather than feigning. 
3.1.4 Intelligence and ILK performance. Aside from studies conducted by the 
test authors during the test development phase, only three studies have examined the 
performance of the ILK in various samples. Gottfried and Carbonell (2014) examined the 
relationship between ILK performance and intelligence. The sample consisted of 65 
college students and 65 psychiatric inpatients deemed IST. The correlation between total 
ILK score and intelligence as measured by the Shipley-2 Vocabulary subtest was .47 
across both samples. Among patients, the ILK items most highly correlated with 
intelligence were items 12 (r = .44) and 34 (r = .40), which are both related to testifying. 
The total ILK score was moderately correlated with intelligence (r = .38) within the 
patient sample. Among the student sample, items 45 and 34 were most correlated with 
intelligence (r = .40 and .31, respectively). The total ILK score was moderately correlated 
with intelligence in the student sample (r = .35). 
Gottfried and Carbonell (2014) correlated ILK item and total scores with three 
levels of intelligence: extremely low, low average/average, and average/high average. 
Interestingly, each level of intelligence was most highly correlated with different ILK 
items. In the extremely low group, the highest correlations were with items 7 (r = -.42), 
17 (r = .32), and 26 (r = .40). The inverse correlation with item 7 suggests that as 
intelligence score increased, performance on the item decreased. Within the low 
average/average group, the strongest correlations were with items 1 (r = .33) and 44 (r = -
.34). Item 44 exhibited an inverse correlation. Within the average/high average group, the 
largest correlations were with items 11 (r = .29), 23 (r = .33), 33 (r = .36), and 34 (r = 
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.33). Across all the groups, item 20 was answered incorrectly by 41.5% of the 
participants, which was significantly more than the percentage of participants who got 
any other item incorrect. This may suggest that item 20 is a poorly written item or overly 
difficult, but no proposed explanation was offered by the researchers (Gottfried & 
Carbonell, 2014). 
3.2 Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT) 
 
The Rey Fifteen Item Test (RFIT; Rey, 1964) is another PVT designed to detect 
malingered memory deficits. It is frequently used in neuropsychological assessments 
because it is relatively easy and quick (five minutes) to administer (Nitch, Boone, Wen, 
Arnold, & Alfano, 2006). The test is administered by an examiner who presents the 
patient with a stimulus card that contains five rows of three stimuli (letters or numbers, a 
total of 15 characters) for ten seconds. The range of possible scores is 0 to 15, with lower 
scores thought to be more suggestive of malingered memory deficits. The examiner asks 
the patient to try to remember as many of the stimuli as possible, and expresses to the 
patient that the task is very difficult. In reality, the task is very simple, so simple that even 
a severely impaired patient would be able to successfully complete it. Thus, the idea is 
that if a patient performs poorly on this task, it raises suspicion that the patient is 
exaggerating or faking their memory deficit (Arnett, Hammeke, & Schwartz, 1995; Hays, 
Emmons, & Lawson, 1993; Lee, Loring, & Martin, 1992; Love, Glassmire, Zanolini, & 
Wolf, 2014; Reznek, 2005; Stimmel, Green, Belfri, & Klavar, 2012). I compared scores 
on the RFIT and the ILK to obtain convergent validity evidence for the ILK. Given that 
both measures are PVTs, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they will yield similar results 
if the individual is taking a cognitive approach to feigning. If the two tests do, in fact, 
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provide similar results, it will provide some support for the ILK’s function as a validity 
measure. 
Several studies have examined the specificity and sensitivity associated with 
various cut scores to obtain information about the psychometric properties of the RFIT. 
An early study found that the RFIT has low sensitivity (5%) for detecting malingering in 
patients who were asked to simulate malingered cognitive deficits (Guilmette, Hart, 
Giuliano, & Leininger, 1994). Similarly, another study found poor sensitivity and 
adequate specificity for a sample of neurological patients with various conditions. 
Specifically, a cut score of fewer than two rows correctly recalled resulted in a sensitivity 
of between 47% and 64%, and a specificity of between 64% and 96% across two studies 
(Arnett et al., 1995). A meta-review of 13 studies provided more evidence for low 
sensitivity and good specificity of the RFIT. Using a cut score of nine, the overall 
sensitivity was poor at 36%, but the overall specificity was good at 85% (Reznek, 2005). 
A team of researchers added a recognition trial to the administration of the RFIT 
after the initial presentation of the stimulus card (Boone, Salazar, Lu, Warner-Chacon, & 
Razani, 2002). The recognition trial involves showing the examinee another stimulus 
card with several items, 15 of which were the items presented on the prior stimulus sheet. 
The examiner asks the examinee to circle the items that were presented on the prior card. 
The range of possible combined scores (recall + recognition – false positives) is 0 to 30, 
with lower scores thought to be more suggestive of malingered memory deficits. The 
addition of this trial has been shown to increase the sensitivity of the test. A combined cut 
score of 21 (out of a possible 30) across the recall and recognition trial resulted in a 
sensitivity of 70% and a specificity of 92.8% in a sample of forensic patients referred for 
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neuropsychological testing (Morse, Douglas-Newman, Mandel, & Swirsky-Sacchetti, 
2013). Another study used data from a sample of 116 forensic inpatients undergoing CST 
evaluations who were classified by the treatment teams as either malingering or honest. 
The use of a recognition trial and a combined cut score of 20 increased the sensitivity of 
the RFIT from 44% to 46% with a sample of individuals thought to be feigning (Stimmel 
et al., 2012). Taken together, the findings of these studies suggest that the addition of a 
recognition trial noticeably increases the sensitivity of the RFIT. 
Although the sensitivity of the RFIT is not high unless a recognition trial is added, 
overall, the test seems to have similar sensitivity and false positive rates as other tests that 
are designed to detect malingering (Nitch et al., 2006). The archival data that were used 
for the current study included the recognition trial in the administration of the RFIT so as 
to maximize the sensitivity of the instrument. 
3.3 Wide Range Achievement Test-4 (WRAT-4) Word Reading Subtest 
 
 The Wide Range Achievement Test-4 (WRAT-4; Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006) 
is the fourth revision of the WRAT and measures many academic skills: single-word 
reading, spelling, sentence comprehension, and math. Of interest to the current study is 
the single-word reading subtest. This subtest involves an examiner presenting the patient 
with a list of words and asking the patient to read them aloud (Wilkinson & Robertson, 
2006). The range of possible scores is 0 to 70, with higher scores indicative of higher 
reading ability and better verbal skills. Percentiles by age group and grade-equivalent 
scores can also be calculated. 
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The WRAT-4 was standardized using a sample of 3,021 individuals ages 5 to 94. 
The distribution of gender, race/ethnicity, age, education level, and geographic region 
was matched to U.S. Census information. This sample was used to obtain reliability and 
validity information for the WRAT-4. Given that the current study only used the single-
word reading subtest, only the psychometric properties associated with that subtest will 
be discussed. The average internal consistency reliability coefficient for the word reading 
subtest across both forms of the WRAT-4 is .92 (Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006), which 
indicates high internal reliability (α > .70 is desirable; Cronbach, 1951). This value 
indicates that the items on this subtest are highly related and, thus, likely measure the 
same construct (i.e., basic reading ability).  
In a situation in which the WRAT-4 is administered to the same individual on two 
occasions to evaluate an examinee’s change in general functioning over time, it is 
necessary to give the second form of the test on the second testing occasion, rather than 
the same form. This reduces the likelihood of practice effects impacting the individual’s 
score. Thus, it is important to calculate alternate-form re-test reliability coefficients for 
the WRAT-4. The average immediate re-test reliability coefficient for the word reading 
subtest across all ages of the standardization sample (range = 5 – 94) is .86. The average 
delayed re-test reliability coefficient was also calculated for word reading subtest by 
administering the two forms of the test to the same individuals (n = 329) approximately 
30.7 (SD = 11.5, range = 8 to 86, median = 28) days apart. The resulting coefficient was 
.85 across all ages. The mean difference between the scores at the first and second testing 
occasion was only 0.50 (Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006). These results suggest that the 
WRAT-4 produces consistent scores both when the two forms are administered at the 
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same time and when there is a delay between the administrations. To obtain further 
validity evidence for the WRAT-4, its subtests were correlated with other instruments 
designed to measure similar constructs. The word reading subtest was correlated .71 with 
the word reading subtest of the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test II, .66 with the 
basic reading subtest of the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement, .76 with the 
letter/word recognition subtest of the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement (KTEA) 
II, and .75 with the reading subtest of the KTEA Brief Form (Wilkinson & Robertson, 
2006). Taken together, these moderate to high correlations suggest that the word reading 
subtest of the WRAT-4 measures something similar to reading ability, as it is intended to 
do. 
Reading is thought to be a relatively stable skill that is not harshly impacted by 
brain disease or injury; thus, the word reading subtest is frequently used to measure an 
individual’s premorbid verbal intelligence (Caplan, 2011; Johnstone & Wilhelm, 1996). 
Several studies have used the WRAT word reading subtest as a measure of premorbid 
verbal intelligence with a variety of samples, including those with serious mental 
illnesses (i.e., schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, Goldberg et al., 1993; Harvey et al., 
2006; Keefe, Eesley, & Poe, 2005; Kremen et al., 1996), which is particularly relevant to 
the current study given that the current sample will contain individuals with serious 
mental illnesses. For example, Harvey and colleagues (2006) administered the word 
reading subtest of the WRAT-3 to 218 elderly patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
The patients scored an average of 44.47 (SD = 27.46) at baseline, and an average of 43.05 
(SD = 23.03) at the follow-up (six years after baseline). This difference was not 
significantly different, t(217) = .54, p = .71, which indicates that WRAT-3 word reading 
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scores are stable over time and thus can be used as a measure of premorbid verbal 
intelligence (Harvey et al., 2006).  
 One team of researchers examined the consistency of scores on the WRAT word 
reading subtest over time (Johnstone & Wilhelm, 1996). Performance on the subtest was 
compared with full-scale intelligence (FSIQ) as measured by the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) for 39 patients who were referred for a secondary 
neuropsychological assessment. WRAT word reading subtest scores did not significantly 
change for those who showed intellectual decline in terms of FSIQ, t(38) = .56, p < 1.00, 
or for those who remained stable (0 to 6 point increase) on FSIQ, t(38) = 1.43, p < .218. 
However, scores did significantly improve for those who showed greater than a 6-point 
increase on FSIQ, t(38) = 5.82, p < .001. The results suggest that it is appropriate to use 
the word reading subtest as a measure of premorbid intelligence for those who decline or 
remain stable over time, but not for those who have not yet fully recovered and so may 
experience gains in intelligence (Johnstone & Wilhelm, 1996).  
 Given the results of prior studies and the use of the WRAT word reading subtest 
with similar samples to the current sample (i.e., individuals with serious mental illnesses), 
I used the WRAT-4 word reading subtest as a measure of premorbid verbal intelligence. 
It is unlikely that the sample of psychiatric inpatients experienced large gains in 
intelligence that made the WRAT-4 word reading subtest an underestimation of their 
premorbid verbal intelligence, given that the patients needed to consent to participate in 
the research study and would only have been able to do so if they were recovered fully 
enough to have had the capacity to consent. Thus, I explored how performance on the 
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ILK varied as a function of verbal intelligence, as measured by the WRAT-4 word 
reading subtest. 
3.4 Personality Assessment Screener (PAS) 
 
 The Personality Assessment Screener (PAS; Morey, 1997) is a 22-item self-report 
questionnaire that was extracted from its parent instrument, the Personality Assessment 
Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991). It is not a comprehensive instrument, but rather is a brief 
measure designed to identify areas that require further assessment. The measure covers 
the same 10 domains of emotional and behavioral issues that are covered by the PAI: 
Negative Affect (NA), Acting Out (AO), Health Problems (HP), Psychotic Features (PF), 
Social Withdrawal (SW), Hostile Control (HC), Suicidal Thinking (ST), Alienation (AN), 
Alcohol Problem (AP), and Anger Control (AC). These 10 domains, or factors, were 
identified in an analysis of the factor structure of the PAI. The 22 items that make up the 
PAS were chosen to equally cover the 10 domains (Morey, 1997). Examinees respond to 
each item on a Likert-type scale (“false,” “slightly true,” “mainly true,” “very true”). The 
range of possible total scores is 0 to 66, with higher scores representing an increased 
likelihood of future self-report assessments identifying significant problems. The range of 
possible scores for the NA and AO elements is 0 to 9. The range of possible scores for 
the other eight elements is 0 to 6. Probability scores, which indicate the likelihood of 
future assessments identifying clinically significant issues, can also be obtained when 
scoring the instrument. 
 Given that the PAS is a self-report measure, responses can be influenced by a 
number of factors that may lead to distortion of the results. Although not a full built-in 
validity scale, the author of the PAS has identified some ways in which random 
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responding, negative impression management, and positive impression management can 
be identified (Morey, 1997). Of interest to the current study is the identification of 
negative impression management, or malingering. In a research study, college students 
were asked to respond to the PAS while pretending to have symptoms of a serious mental 
illness. The results showed that the total probability score was extremely elevated (M = 
98.55, SD = 7.17, range = 55.11 to 99.98). After conducting an analysis of cut scores, 
Morey (1997) recommended a cut score for the total probability score of 99.88 (raw score 
of ≥ 46) given that 70% of simulated malingered responses obtained a value this high and 
fewer than 5% of patients with genuine symptoms obtained that high of a value. 
The instrument was standardized for individuals ages 18 and older. Normative 
data were obtained from three samples: a sample of 1,000 community members, a sample 
of 1,246 adult patients with a variety of diagnosis from various clinical settings, and a 
sample of 1,051 college students. The clinical sample scored higher than the community 
sample on all element scores and the total score. Specifically, the clinical sample scored 
an average of 25.83 (SD = 9.99), whereas the community sample had an average of 16.66 
(SD = 7.40). The sample of college students scored slightly higher on some elements (i.e., 
NA and AO) than the community sample, but there was less variability across the scores. 
The mean total PAS score for the college student sample was 17.55 (SD = 6.89; Morey, 
1997).  
The PAS has been shown to have desirable psychometric properties. Internal 
consistency reliability for the PAS total score for the community, clinical, and student 
sample was .75, .79, and .72, respectively. These values are adequate (α > .70 is 
desirable; Cronbach, 1951). Test re-test reliability was also obtained for the community 
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and college student sample. There were 24 days, on average, between testing occasions 
for the community sample, and 28 for the college student sample. Test re-test reliability 
was adequate for both the community and student sample at .87 and .85, respectively 
(Morey, 1997). Validity information was also obtained for the PAS by correlating its total 
score and element scores from the three samples with scores on other measures of related 
constructs. For example, the NA subscale was moderately correlated with the Depression 
subscale of the MMPI (r = .53) and the PAI Depression subscale (r = .62). Similarly, the 
SW subscale was correlated moderately with the Social Introversion subscale of the 
MMPI (r = .59). These correlations provide some evidence that the PAS subscales 
measure the construct they are intended to measure. The average scaled scores of various 
clinical groups was also compared to gain validity evidence. For example, individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia scored higher than other clinical groups on the PF subscale 
(M = 64.2), while individuals diagnosed with alcohol abuse/dependence scored very high 
on the AP subscale (M = 82.9; Morey, 1997). This information provides further support 
for the PAS as a screening tool that can be used to detect areas indicative of a clinical 
issue. 
The PAI has been used with samples similar to that of the current study, namely 
psychiatric inpatients admitted for clinical treatment (Bell-Pringle, Pate, & Brown, 1997; 
Boone, 1998), forensic psychiatric inpatients (Douglas, Hart, & Kropp, 2001; Rogers, 
Gillard, Wooley, & Ross, 2011), and various forensic and correctional facility samples 
(Boccaccini, Murrie, & Duncan, 2006; Edens, Cruise, Buffington-Vollum, 2001; Morey 
& Quigley, 2002; Rogers, Ustad, & Salekin, 1998). Given that the PAI has been used 
with these samples, it follows that the PAS would also have utility in these samples. 
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However, few studies have examined its use with such samples. Christensen, Girard, 
Benjamin, and Vidailhet (2006) employed the PAS to gain symptom information from 28 
patients with schizophrenia during a study of mnemonic abilities. They found that healthy 
controls and patients diagnosed with schizophrenia obtained significantly different total 
scores on the PAS, t(27) = 3.38, p = .001. Specifically, patients obtained a more impaired 
score (M = 17.38, SD = 7.38), on average, than healthy controls (M = 11.22, SD = 5.56). 
They concluded that the PAS can therefore be used as a screening measure for the 
detection of schizophrenia. Harrison and Rogers (2007) administered the PAS to 100 jail 
detainees along with a battery of other assessments. The NA scale was useful as a 
screening measure for depression with a correct classification rate of 80%. 
The majority of the research on the PAS has been conducted using other samples, 
such as low-income urban women (Porcerelli, Kurtz, Cogan, Markova, & Mickens, 2012) 
and college students (Kelley, Edens, & Morey, 2016). In a study of 100 low-income 
urban women, Porcerelli and colleagues (2012) determined that the PAS was a useful 
screening tool for mood disorders, cluster B personality disorders, and alcohol use 
disorders given that PAS scales were moderately correlated with other measures of 
related constructs (e.g., the AP element was correlated .40 with the Alcohol Use 
Disorders Test). Kelley and colleagues (2016) obtained convergent validity evidence for 
the PAS by correlating PAS self-reports of college students and informant reports 
(obtained from the students’ roommates) as measured by the PAS-Other. The PAS-Other 
is completed by someone other than the individual of interest who can answer questions 
about the individual’s behaviors and emotions. The reports were moderately related, r = 
.45, p < .01. 
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Given the body of validity evidence for the PAS, I attempted to determine the 
relationship between ILK performance and performance on both the overall PAS and 
scores from its subscales. That is, I was interested in using the PAS as a measure of 
clinical presentation, and examining the nature of the relationship between clinical 
presentation/symptoms and ILK performance. I also looked for particularly high total 
scores on the PAS that may have indicated possible feigning, as discussed previously. 
  




Description of Data Analysis 
A variety of analyses were used to explore the psychometric properties of the 
scores from the ILK and the performance of the sample on the test. All analyses were 
conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics version 23.0 (IBM Corp, 2015). Only scores on the 
ILK from participants who had a 5th grade reading level or higher as measured by the 
WRAT-4 reading subtest were included in most analyses. Analyses of data from all 
participants, regardless of reading level, will be noted. Descriptive statistics (means, 
standard deviations, and frequencies) were computed for the test scores and various 
demographic and historical variables including age at time of testing, gender, race, 
diagnosis, age of illness onset, duration of illness, education level, and psychiatric 
history. Information about present legal charges was also obtained for the forensic 
sample. 
To evaluate how the sample of inpatients performed on the ILK, I examined 
average total scores and conducted an item analysis for the entire sample, as well as for 
each group (forensic participants, civil participants, competent defendants, and 
incompetent defendants). Item analysis involves examining performance on a test at the 
item-level, which can be useful for assessing problems with the overall instrument 
(Ferketich, 1991). Evaluating differences in item-level performance between forensic and 
civil patients was done to provide some insight into how performance of a group more 
likely to feign incompetence (i.e., forensic participants) compared to a group with less 
incentive to engage in this type of feigning (i.e., civil participants). The item analysis 
included an examination of the response patterns for each participant to determine if there 
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was a particular way in which forensic and civil patients tend to respond to the items. 
Item discrimination aided in identifying items that best discriminated between forensic 
and civil patients, as these items should be best able to differentiate between feigners and 
honest responders. Item discrimination was calculated by comparing the ratio of the 
proportion of those who correctly answered the item in the forensic group to the 
proportion of those who correctly answered the item in the civil group (i.e., the relative 
risk ratio). I evaluated if there were any ratios that indicated a large discrepancy between 
the forensic and civil groups, specifically looking for items that forensic participants 
tended to answer incorrectly and that civil patients tended to answer correctly. 
Additionally, I conducted similar comparisons of the competent and incompetent 
defendants to ascertain if performance was related to competence-related abilities/level of 
legal knowledge. 
I examined the item difficulty of each of the 61 items to determine if there were 
particular items that many participants (25% or more) answered incorrectly (i.e., the item 
is too difficult for this sample). A cut off score of 25% was selected to be comparable to 
prior cut scores of 5% and 10% that were used with a sample of nearly 100 participants 
(Rogers et al., 2015). That is, prior researchers identified items that five to 10 participants 
incorrectly answered, and a cut score equal to 10 participants out of the total sample (i.e., 
25% of 40) was selected for this study. In the context of the ILK, a difficult item would 
be one that even those responding honestly tend to get incorrect. As discussed previously, 
identification of these items is important because they are unlikely to be effective for 
differentiating feigned and honest responding. I also examined the wording and content 
area of the items, item difficulty indices, corrected item total correlation, coefficient-
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alpha-if-item-deleted, and the inter-item correlations. Item difficulty indices were 
calculated by obtaining the proportion of respondents who answered the item correctly. 
The corrected item-total correlation is an indication of how related a particular item is to 
the rest of the test. The item is essentially correlated with the total score of the test; 
corrected item-total correlations do not include the score on the item in the total score so 
as to not inflate the correlation. Ideally, for a theoretically one-dimensional test like the 
ILK, each item should be highly related to the entire test. Similarly, the value of the 
coefficient-alpha-if-item-deleted should remain the same or decrease, as that would 
indicate that the addition of the item does not decrease the reliability of the test and is 
thus a “good” item. The inter-item correlations among the ILK items should theoretically 
be high, given that the test authors designed the ILK to measure one construct. If a 
particular item is not highly correlated with other items on a given measure, then that 
item may be measuring a different construct than the other items on the instrument 
(Ferketich, 1991). 
 I obtained reliability evidence for the ILK in the form of coefficient alpha. 
Coefficient alpha is a measure of the consistency of the items on a test (Cronbach, 1951). 
That is, it indicates how related the items are to each other. Obtaining an estimate of 
internal reliability is especially important for tests that are assumed to measure one 
construct. If this assumption is true, it is valid to report one score as a representation of 
performance on the entire test. However, if this assumption is false, it would be more 
accurate to report subscale scores. For a test like the ILK, which was designed to measure 
one construct (i.e., response style to questions about a defendant’s legal knowledge), a 
measure of internal consistency is expected to reflect the inter-relatedness of the items. It 
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is important to note that a high internal reliability estimate is not necessarily an indication 
that the test is unidimensional; rather, it only indicates that the items are related (Green, 
Lissitz, & Mulaik, 1977).  
I conducted a set of analyses to evaluate the construct validity of the instrument in 
order to determine if the ILK functioned as a validity measure or as a test of legal 
knowledge. Prior studies have responded to this issue by conducting simulation studies in 
which ILK performance is compared between a group asked to respond honestly and a 
group asked to “fake bad,” or pretend to feign incompetence (Gottfried et al., 2015; 
Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 2015). Such studies diminish the 
possibility of the alternative explanation of a low ILK score being indicative of a lack of 
legal knowledge, rather than feigning, due to the controlled nature and random 
assignment of group membership. These studies have found fairly good support for the 
utility of the ILK as a measure to detect feigning. The simulation approach was not 
possible given the archival nature of the present study; however, I used other statistical 
methods to attempt to determine how the ILK performed as a validity measure in the 
current sample. Following data collection, I created a variable identifying if a participant 
was a forensic or civil patient. This variable was then correlated with ILK scores to see if 
presence of an external incentive to feign incompetence (legal charges for this sample) 
was associated with poor performance on the ILK. Similarly, to evaluate if the ILK could 
differentiate those more likely to be feigners of incompetence and those more likely to be 
honest responders, an independent t-test was conducted to compare the ILK scores of 
forensic and civil patients. An independent t-test was also used to evaluate the ILK scores 
of competent and incompetent defendants to determine if there was an indirect 
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relationship between competence-related abilities/level of legal knowledge and 
performance on the ILK. Due to the small sample size, I also focused on inspecting the 
raw mean differences and effect sizes to evaluate the differences between these groups, 
rather than relying solely on the results of the significance tests. Cohen’s d, a measure of 
the standardized difference between two means, was calculated as the effect size (Cohen, 
1992). To further probe significant mean differences, I conducted regression analyses to 
control for variables such as education and duration of illness. 
The range and distribution of scores was also examined for the entire sample, 
forensic participants only, and civil participants only to determine if the scores were 
restricted above the highest cut score (as would occur for a validity test) or created a 
normal distribution (which would suggest that the ILK is closer to a test of legal 
knowledge than a test of response style). I identified the forensic or civil status of any 
participants who obtain score of 47 or below. 
One way to obtain construct validity evidence is by examining a test’s 
relationship with other tests. Ideally, tests that measure the same construct should be 
highly correlated. This is known as convergent validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
Convergent validity evidence would lend information about construct validity, or if the 
ILK actually detects feigning as it was developed to do. This was obtained for the current 
study by correlating ILK total scores with RFIT combination scores. I also determined if 
any participants were classified as potential feigners on both tests. Due to the fact that the 
RFIT is a memory test and a measure of cognitive effort, I expected only a moderate 
correlation between it and the ILK; that is, RFIT scores for individuals who were 
feigning psychiatric symptoms but not cognitive deficits were not expected to correlate 
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highly with the ILK.  However, even a moderate correlation with the RFIT would support 
the interpretation of the ILK as a validity measure, rather than a test of legal knowledge. I 
determined if any participants who obtained a total probability score of 99.88 or greater 
(raw score of ≥ 46) on the PAS were also classified as possibly feigning on the RFIT or 
the ILK. I also correlated ILK total scores with PAS total probability scores. Similar to 
the RFIT, I expected only a moderate correlation between the ILK and PAS given that the 
PAS is used to evaluate symptom validity. 
To evaluate the relationship between ILK total scores and demographic, clinical, 
and legal variables, I obtained correlations between those variables and the total test 
score. I determined the relationship between the ILK scores and premorbid verbal 
intelligence by obtaining correlations between ILK total scores and item scores and 
WRAT-4 word reading standardized scores. Similarly, I examined the relationship 
between clinical symptoms and ILK performance by correlating the ILK total scores and 
PAS total standardized scores, and ILK total scores with PAS standardized element 
scores. 
  





Participants (N = 40) were individuals admitted to a southeastern state psychiatric 
hospital. There were 22 individuals admitted for civil commitment, 12 admitted to be 
evaluated for adjudicative competence, five admitted for pre-trial treatment, and one 
admitted for post-sentence treatment. Participants admitted for pre-trial treatment were 
included in the forensic group, which also included those admitted for a CST evaluation, 
given that they have secondary gain in the form of delaying their legal proceedings2. The 
one participant who was admitted for post-sentence treatment was included in the civilly-
committed group due to lack of secondary gain (i.e., no incentive to feign 
incompetence)3. Thus, there were 17 forensically-committed patients and 23 civilly-
committed patients in the sample. Of the 12 defendants admitted for a CST evaluation, 
eight were opined by a forensic evaluator to be competent to stand trial and four were 
opined incompetent but restorable4. The court agreed with the opinion of the forensic 
evaluator on 100% of cases for which I could obtain information regarding the court’s 
decision regarding trial competence (n = 5)5. 
The majority of the participants were male (75%). Age ranged from 18 to 62 (M = 
36.73, SD = 13.79). Of the participants, 57.5% were Caucasian, 22.5% were African 
                                                          
2 These defendants did not significantly differ from those admitted for a CST evaluation in terms of 
relevant demographic characteristics or test performance. 
3 The test scores of the defendant admitted for post-sentence treatment were not more than one standard 
deviation away from the mean of the civilly-committed group. Similarly, the defendant’s demographic 
characteristics were within the range of the civilly-committed groups’ characteristics. 
4 This group of defendants will be referred to as incompetent for the purposes of the current study. 
5 Final information regarding the court’s finding of competence was obtained for five of the 12 defendants 
admitted for an evaluation of trial competence. Information was not obtained for the other seven defendants 
either because the court’s final decision regarding competence was unclear (e.g., the case was nolle 
prosequi or dismissed; n = 4) or final disposition information was not available by April 1, 2017 (n = 3). 
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American, 2.5% were Asian, and 17.5% were another race (e.g., biracial or mixed race). 
Participants were diagnosed mostly with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (50%), bipolar 
disorder (27.5%), and/or substance use disorders (42.5%). Onset of illness ranged from 
nine to 51 years old (M = 20.06, SD = 10.46) and duration ranged from less than one year 
to 47 years (M = 15.46, SD = 11.28). Additionally, two participants were assumed to 
have lifetime issues due to intellectual disability. Seventy-five percent of the participants 
had some prior non-psychiatric medical history (e.g., history of seizures, asthma, and 
hyperthyroidism). The vast majority of the sample had previously been admitted to an 
inpatient psychiatric hospital (90%) and/or had been prescribed psychiatric medications 
(90%). Education level ranged from 6 to 18 years (M = 12.33, SD = 1.99). Thirty percent 
of participants had experience with special education. The majority of the participants 
were currently unemployed (72.5%) or on disability (25%). Most of the participants had 
never been married (67.5%) or were divorced (25%). See Table 2 for complete 
demographic information and Table 3 for legal information of the forensic sample. 
 Thirty-nine participants completed the RFIT; the average combination score was 
23.28 (SD = 7.20, range = 4 to 30). The range of possible combination scores was 0 to 
30. There were 37 participants who completed the WRAT-4 word reading subtest. The 
average standard score was 88.95 (SD = 10.98, range = 66 to 113). On average, 
participants scored at a 9th grade reading level (M = 9.64, SD = 2.97, range = 3.10 to 
12.90). The average total probability score on the PAS was 74.42 (SD = 31.75, range = 
1.31 to 99.58) for 32 participants who had complete data on the test. This indicates that, 
on average, participants in this sample were at a moderate risk for potential clinically 
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significant emotional and/or behavioral problems. See Table 4 for complete information 
on test performance. 
5.1 Performance on the ILK  
There were 32 participants who completed the ILK who also had the appropriate 
reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The 
average total score on the ILK was 55.03 (SD = 4.83, range = 40 to 61), which is above 
the highest cut score used to indicate possible feigning (i.e., 47). Three participants 
obtained a total score lower than 47; all of which were civil participants. The average 
cumulative percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was 63.94 (SD 
= 24.84, range = 10 to 99). Four participants took the ILK but had a reading level lower 
than 5th grade; all of these participants had a diagnosis of intellectual disability and 
scored below 47 on the ILK (range = 28 to 43).  
An item analysis was conducted to evaluate the pattern of responses of the 32 
participants who completed the ILK. Participants tended to answer “true” rather than 
“false” on all items. On average, participants answered “true” to 55 items and “false” to 
11 items. Of the 32 participants who completed the ILK, an average of 29 participants 
answered “true” and only three answered “false” to an item. There were 13 of the 61 
items that all participants correctly answered: 4, 6, 10, 19, 26, 27, 28, 30, 37, 40, 48, 52, 
and 53. Although there were no obvious overarching themes in the content of these items, 
the majority of the statements tended to be shorter than other items on the test and only 
contained one clause. Ten of these items had a correct answer of “true,” and the other 
three had a correct answer of “false.” There were also several items that appeared to be 
difficult for the sample. Specifically, 25% or more of the sample (i.e., eight or more 
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participants) incorrectly answered items 20 (37.5%), 25 (28.1%), 43 (40.6%), 44 
(37.5%), 46 (34.4%), and 59 (25.0%). These items tended to be long in length and two 
contained more than one clause. All but one of these items had a correct answer of 
“false.” The three participants who scored less than 47 on the ILK incorrectly answered 
these items, with the exception of items 44 and 59. One of the three participants correctly 
answered each of those items. The corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-
deleted values were also examined (see Table 5). The mean inter-item correlation was 
very low at .079 (range = -.293 to 1.00). Corrected item-total correlations lower than .079 
may represent a problem with the item. Items that had a low corrected item-total 
correlation were 15 (r = .008), 17 (r = .031), 24 (r = .032), 38 (r = -.111), 44 (r = .053), 
57 (r = .002), 58 (r = -.035), and 60 (r = .053). 
5.1.1 Forensically- and civilly-committed participants. There were 13 forensic 
participants who completed the ILK who also had the appropriate reading level as 
measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The average ILK total 
score was 57.23 (SD = 2.98, range = 51 to 61), and no forensic participants obtained a 
total score lower than the highest cut score used to identify feigning (i.e., 47). The 
average cumulative percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was 
75.00 (SD = 20.34, range = 38 to 99). There were 19 civil participants who completed the 
ILK who also had the appropriate reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word 
reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The average total score on the ILK was 53.53 (SD = 5.33, 
range = 40 to 59). Three civil participants had a total score lower than 47. The average 
cumulative percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was 56.37 (SD 
= 25.26, range = 10 to 91). The mean difference between forensic and civil patients on 
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the ILK total score was statistically significant, t(30) = -2.27, p = .031, d = .82, with 
forensic participants obtaining higher average total scores than civil participants. The 
mean difference was practically significant, given that the effect size was large according 
to standards for Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992). There were no meaningful differences in 
response patterns across the two groups. 
Further analyses were conducted to understand the mean difference between 
forensic and civil patients on the ILK. Separate multiple regression analyses were done to 
determine if forensic and civil patients differed on the ILK when controlling for 
education, WRAT-4 word reading standard scores, types of diagnoses, prior offenses, 
prior incarceration, duration of illness, and onset of illness. These variables were chosen 
because they could reasonably account for the mean difference between the groups (e.g., 
higher education, prior experience with the legal system, illness severity). These models 
were the equivalent of an analysis of covariance, each with only one covariate. In each 
regression model, one of these variables was entered in as a predictor variable/covariate. 
Forensic status was also entered into each model as a predictor variable. The dependent 
variable used for all models was ILK total scores. Interactions were included to check the 
assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes; there were no statistically significant 
interactions between forensic status and the covariates. When controlling for education, 
forensic status (b = 3.56, p = .039, sr2 = .366) significantly predicted ILK scores. When 
controlling for WRAT-4 word reading subtest standard score, forensic status (b = 3.63, p 
= .023, sr2 = .375) significantly predicted ILK scores. When controlling for 
neurodevelopmental disorder, forensic status (b = 3.75, p = .031, sr2 = .387) significantly 
predicted ILK scores. When controlling for schizophrenia spectrum disorder, forensic 
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status (b = 3.61, p = .042, sr2 = .364) significantly predicted ILK scores. When 
controlling for trauma disorder, forensic status (b = 3.70, p = .033, sr2 = .382) 
significantly predicted ILK scores. Finally, when controlling for substance use disorder, 
forensic status (b = 3.99, p = .021, sr2 = .408) significantly predicted ILK scores. 
Forensic status was not a significant predictor when included in a model containing prior 
offenses, prior incarceration, duration of illness, onset of illness, or presence of an 
anxiety disorder, personality disorder, or intellectual disability. One participant, who was 
forensically-committed, had a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder. Similarly, one participant 
had a diagnosis of intellectual disability and was a forensic participant. There were six 
participants with a diagnosis of a personality disorder, five of which were civil 
participants. 
Item discrimination was calculated by dividing the percentage of correct 
responses from forensic participants by the percentage of correct responses from civil 
participants. See Table 6 for item discrimination statistics. Ratios greater than 1 indicated 
that forensic participants had a higher percentage of correct responses and ratios less than 
1 indicated that civil participants had a higher percentage of correct responses. Ratios 
equal to 1 indicate that forensic and civil patients had the same percentage of correct 
responses. There were 39 items on which forensic participants had a higher percentage of 
correct responses (1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 
38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, and 61), and nine items 
on which civil participants had a higher percentage (7, 11, 18, 22, 25, 29, 34, 58, and 59). 
Item 44, which is about the different pleas a defendant can enter, had the largest 
discrepancy in correct responses from forensic and civil participants, with nearly all 
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(92.3%) of the forensic participants correctly answering the item and less than half 
(42.1%) of civil participants correctly answering it. Similarly, item 46, which is about 
responsibilities of the defense attorney, was correctly answered by 92.3% of forensic 
participants and only 47.4% of civil participants. The majority of the items on which the 
civil participants had a higher percentage of correct responses were related to the role of 
the defendant in legal proceedings. All participants correctly answered the remaining 13 
items. 
An item analysis was conducted to evaluate the pattern of responses of the 13 
forensic participants who completed the ILK. The entire group correctly answered the 
majority of the items on the ILK. That is, there were 34 items that all participants in this 
group correctly answered: 3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, and 61. There were also items 
that appeared to be difficult for the sample. Specifically, 25% or more of the sample (i.e., 
four or more participants; 30.8%) incorrectly answered items 20 (30.8%), 25 (30.8%), 43 
(30.8%), and 59 (30.8%). These incorrect responses were not from the same four 
participants. As previously mentioned, these items tended to be longer, have more than 
one clause, and have a correct answer of “false.” The average inter-item correlation was 
.071 (range = -.365 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total correlation lower than 
.071 were 1 (r = .031), 8 (r = -.091), 9 (r = -.017), 34 (r = -.039), 44 (r = -.362), 46 (r = 
.031), 49 (r = -.070), 59 (r = .069), and 60 (r = -.070). See Table 7 for all corrected item-
total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the forensic participants. 
Another item analysis was done to examine the performance of the 19 civil 
participants who completed the ILK. There were 15 items that all participants in this 
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group correctly answered: 4, 6, 10, 18, 19, 26, 27, 28, 30, 37, 40, 48, 52, 53, and 58. 
Twenty-five percent or more of the sample (i.e., five or more participants; 26.3%) 
incorrectly answered items 20 (42.1%), 25 (26.3%), 42 (26.3%), 43 (47.4%), 44 (57.9%), 
46 (52.6%), and 55 (26.3%). Again, these items tended to be longer in length, contain 
more than once clause, and have a correct answer of “false.” The average inter-item 
correlation was .086 (range = -.606 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total 
correlation lower than .086 were 13 (r = .072), 15 (r = -.109), 17 (r = -.082), 21 (r = 
.072), 22 (r = .072), 24 (r = -.057), 33 (r = .042), 38 (r = -.199), 42 (r = .045), 44 (r = -
.099), 54 (r = -.001), 57 (r = -.064), and 60 (r = .029). See Table 8 for all corrected item-
total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the civil participants. 
5.1.2 Competent and incompetent defendants. There were seven defendants 
opined to be competent by a forensic evaluator who completed the ILK and also had the 
appropriate reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). 
The average total score was 57.00 (SD = 3.51, range = 51 to 61). The average cumulative 
percentile using the combined clinical adult reference sample was 74.00 (SD = 22.46, 
range = 38 to 99). There were three defendants opined to be incompetent but restorable 
by a forensic evaluator who completed the ILK who also had the appropriate reading 
level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (≥ 5th grade). The average total 
score was 58.33 (SD = 3.06, range = 55 to 61). The average cumulative percentile using 
the combined clinical adult reference sample was 82.00 (SD = 22.87, range = 56 to 99). 
The mean difference between competent and incompetent defendants on the ILK total 
score was not statistically significantly different, t(8) = .568, p = .586, d = .39, with a 
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small practical significance according to standards for Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992). There 
were no meaningful differences in the pattern of responses across the two groups. 
Item discrimination was calculated by dividing the percentage of correct 
responses from competent defendants by the percentage of correct responses from 
incompetent defendants. See Table 6 for item discrimination statistics. Ratios greater 
than 1 indicated that competent defendants had a higher percentage of correct responses 
and ratios less than 1 indicated that civil participants had a higher percentage of correct 
responses. Ratios equal to 1 indicate that competent and incompetent defendants had the 
same percentage of correct responses. There were six items on which competent 
defendants had a higher percentage of correct responses (2, 7, 11, 29, 34, and 43), and 16 
items on which incompetent participants had a higher percentage (8, 9, 14, 18, 20, 22, 25, 
32, 33, 41, 42, 44, 49, 56, 59, and 60). All participants correctly answered the remaining 
39 items.  
The performance of the seven defendants opined to be CST by an evaluator was 
examined with an item analysis. There were 41 items that all participants in this group 
correctly answered: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, and 61. 
Twenty-five percent or more of the sample (i.e., two or more participants; 28.6%) 
incorrectly answered items 8 (28.6%), 20 (57.1%), 25 (42.9%), 42 (28.6%), and 59 
(28.6%). These items tended to be longer in length, contain more than once clause, and 
have a correct answer of “false.” The average inter-item correlation was .132 (range = -
.548 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total correlation lower than .132 were 8 (r = 
-.138), 9 (r = -.107), 34 (r = -.348), 44 (r = -.463), 49 (r = -.107), and 60 (r = -.107). See 
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Table 9 for all corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the 
competent defendants. 
Another item analysis was conducted to evaluate the response patterns of the three 
defendants opined to be incompetent by a forensic evaluator. All three correctly answered 
all 61 items on the ILK except for items 2, 7, 11, 29, 34, and 43. Two out of three 
(66.7%) of the incompetent defendants incorrectly answered items 11 (66.7%) and 43 
(66.7%)6. These items had to do with a “not guilty” plea. The average inter-item 
correlation was .733 (range = .50 to 1.00). Items that had a corrected item-total 
correlation lower than .733 were 11 (r = .655) and 43 (r = .655). See Table 10 for all 
corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values for the incompetent 
defendants. 
5.2 Reliability and Validity of the ILK 
5.2.1 Reliability. The internal consistency reliability estimate for the ILK when 
including the total sample was .806, which is desirable according to standards for 
Cronbach’s alpha (α > .70; Cronbach, 1951). The reliability estimate was lower when 
including only the forensic participants (n = 13, α = .652) and competent defendants (n = 
7, α = .760). When including only the civil participants (n = 19), the reliability estimate 
was .810, and was .943 for incompetent defendants only (n = 3). When excluding the six 
difficult items (items 20, 25, 43, 44, 46, and 59), the alpha coefficients changed as 
follows: total (α = .765), forensic (α = .657), civil (α = .760), competent (α = .743), 
incompetent (α = .952). 
                                                          
6 Although 25% was the proportion selected for the other subgroups to identify difficult items, a larger 
proportion (2 out of 3, 66.7%) was selected for this group due to the small sample size (n = 3). 
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5.2.2 Validity. There was a significant correlation between ILK total score and 
presence of secondary gain (r = .383, p = .031). The relationship was positive and of 
moderate strength. That is, presence of secondary gain was associated with higher ILK 
total scores. Presence of secondary gain was conflated with having a forensic status; thus, 
those with legal charges obtained higher scores on the ILK than those without. Along 
those lines, there was a statistically and practically significant difference between the 
average ILK total scores of forensic and civil participants, t(30) = -2.27, p = .031, d = .82. 
The average ILK total score of forensic participants was 57.23 (SD = 2.98, range = 51 to 
61), and was 53.53 (SD = 5.33, range = 40 to 59) for civil participants. Forensic 
participants answered an average of four more questions correctly than civil participants. 
There was not a statistically or practically significant difference between the average ILK 
total scores of competent and incompetent defendants, t(8) = .568, p = .586, d = .39. 
Incompetent defendants (M = 58.33, SD = 3.06, range = 55 to 61) answered an average 
of one more question correctly than competent defendants (M = 57.00, SD = 3.51, range 
= 51 to 61). 
To obtain convergent validity evidence, ILK total scores were correlated with 
RFIT combination scores. The relationship between ILK scores and RFIT combination 
scores was not significant, but was significant for the RFIT recall scores (r = .371, p = 
.036). Five participants were classified as possible feigners using the RFIT combination 
scores (scores < 20). Three of these participants were forensic, and two were civil. Two 
participants were classified as potentially feigning using the RFIT recall scores (scores < 
9); these participants also scored below the cut off on the combination scores. One of 
these two participants was forensic, and the other was civil. None of the participants who 
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scored below expectation on the RFIT also scored below the highest cut score on the 
ILK. That is, no participants were classified as possibly feigning by both performance 
validity measures. ILK total scores were also not correlated with PAS total probability 
scores. Six participants were classified as possible feigners using the PAS cut score of 
99.88; none of these participants were classified as feigning on the ILK. Three of these 
participants were forensic, and three were civil. Although there was not a significant 
correlation between the PAS total probability score and either of the RFIT scores, some 
participants were classified as possible feigners on both of these measures. Of the six 
participants classified as feigning on the PAS, two of the forensic participants and one of 
the civil participants scored below expectation on RFIT combination. One of these 
forensic participants and one of these civil participants also scored below expectation on 
RFIT recall.  
The range of total scores on the ILK was also examined for validity evidence (see 
Figure 1). The range of scores for the total sample was 40 to 61. Forensic participants’ 
scores ranged from 51 to 61, and civil participants’ scores ranged from 40 to 59. The 
highest cut score on the ILK that is indicative of possible feigning is 47. Thus, only 
civilly-committed participants were classified as potential feigners. There were three civil 
participants who scored below 47; their total scores were 40, 45, and 46. Two of these 
participants also did poorly on the RFIT (combination scores of 20 and 21). These 
participants were not classified as possibly feigning by the PAS. Additionally, two had 
reading levels as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading subtest (5.8 and 8.6) that were 
lower than the total sample’s mean reading level (M = 9.64, SD = 2.97). These 
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participants did not share a common diagnosis. All three participants had no history of 
incarceration. 
5.3 ILK Performance in Relation to Other Variables 
 
There was a significant relationship between performance on the ILK and the 
estimate for pre-morbid verbal intelligence as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading 
subtest (r = .387, p = .029). The relationship was positive and moderate; this suggests that 
higher verbal intelligence was associated with higher ILK scores. The relationship 
between ILK and WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores was not significant for forensic 
participants, but was significant for civil participants (r = .541, p = .017) with a slightly 
stronger, positive relationship than that of the total sample. WRAT-4 word reading 
subtest standard scores were significantly related to ILK items 16 (r = .367, p = .039) and 
20 (r = .374, p = .035). The positive, moderate correlations indicate that higher WRAT-4 
word reading subtest standard scores were associated with an increased likelihood of 
correctly answering these two items. These items are related to the relationship between 
the defendant and the defense attorney, and both have correct answers of “false.”  
ILK total scores were significantly correlated with onset of illness (r = .368, p = 
.049). This relationship was positive and moderate, suggesting that a later age at which 
psychiatric symptoms began was associated with higher total scores on the ILK. Onset of 
illness was significantly associated with ILK total scores for civil participants (r = .505, p 
= .039), but not forensic participants. In terms of legal variables, ILK total scores were 
significantly related to prior incarceration (r = .410, p = .020). 
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There was also a significant relationship between gender and ILK total score (r = 
-.505, p = .003), with males tending to obtain higher scores on the ILK. The mean ILK 
score for males and females was 56.42 (SD = 3.79, range = 45 to 61) and 50.88 (SD = 
5.46, range = 40 to 56), respectively. Males correctly answered an average of six more 
questions than females. There were 33.33% of the female participants who scored lower 
than the highest cut score on the ILK, as compared to 4.17% of males. This mean 
difference was statistically and practically significant, t(30) = 3.20, p = .003, d = 1.31; 
this significant difference was present when both including and excluding the three low 
scoring participants. This relationship was seen among both civil (r = -.545, p = .024) and 
forensic (r = -.705, p = .007) participants, with a slightly stronger relationship among 
forensic participants. Separate multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine 
if males and females differed on the ILK when controlling for several variables that were 
thought to contribute to the difference (i.e., education level, severity of illness, experience 
with the legal system). These models were the equivalent of an analysis of covariance, 
each with only one covariate. In each regression model, one of these variables was 
entered in as a predictor variable/covariate. Gender was also entered into each model as a 
predictor variable. The dependent variable used for all models was ILK total scores. 
Interactions were included to check the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes; 
there were no statistically significant interactions between the covariates and gender. 
When controlling for forensic status/presence of secondary gain, gender (b = -4.94, p = 
.006, sr2 = .442) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for 
education, gender (b = -5.37, p = .006, sr2 = .471) was a significant predictor of ILK total 
scores. When controlling for WRAT-4 word reading subtest standard scores, gender (b = 
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-5.08, p = .004, sr2 = .459) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When 
controlling for prior offenses, gender (b = -5.22, p = .008, sr2 = .456) was a significant 
predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for prior incarceration, gender (b = -4.55, 
p = .016, sr2 = .391) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for 
onset of illness, gender (b = -5.97, p = .001, sr2 = .560) was a significant predictor of ILK 
total scores. When controlling for duration of illness, gender (b = -6.51, p = .001, sr2 = 
.600) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for 
neurodevelopmental disorder, gender (b = -5.53, p = .004, sr2 = .498) was a significant 
predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for schizophrenia spectrum disorder, 
gender (b = -5.47, p = .004, sr2 = .497) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. 
When controlling for anxiety disorder, gender (b = -5.34, p = .004, sr2 = .484) was a 
significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for trauma disorder, gender (b 
= -5.59, p = .003, sr2 = .508) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. When 
controlling for substance use disorder, gender (b = -5.43, p = .004, sr2 = .491) was a 
significant predictor of ILK total scores. When controlling for personality disorder, 
gender (b = -5.38, p = .006, sr2 = .471) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. 
Finally, when controlling for intellectual disability, gender (b = -5.34, p = .004, sr2 = 
.484) was a significant predictor of ILK total scores. 
  





It is important to note that the results of this study were interpreted with the 
following limitation in mind. It is possible that no forensic participants feigned during 
participation due to the fact that they were aware that participation in the research study 
was independent from both their treatment and CST evaluation. The study had no impact 
on their legal status and thus they had no incentive to feign during participation. This 
limitation restricted the conclusions that I could make about the utility of the ILK in the 
present sample, and the results were interpreted accordingly. 
6.1 Performance on the ILK  
Participants in this sample (M = 55.03, SD = 4.83, range = 40 to 61) performed 
similarly to the community psychiatric inpatient reference sample (M = 53.04, SD = 7.59, 
range = 29 to 61) referenced in the ILK test manual. The sample used in this study 
included more high-scorers than low-scorers; that is, only three participants with the 
appropriate reading level scored below the highest cut score on the ILK. These 
participants were admitted to the hospital for non-forensic, clinical reasons and had no 
history of incarceration. Also, the lowest score obtained in the sample was 11 points 
higher than that of the reference sample. It is therefore possible that this sample included 
participants who tended to obtain higher scores on the ILK than a larger sample (N = 100) 
of psychiatric inpatients. This may be a function of the small sample size. That is, the 
sample used in this study may not have been reflective of a larger population of 
inpatients. It is also important to note that all of the participants who took the ILK but did 
not have the appropriate reading level had a diagnosis of intellectual disability and scored 
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below expectation; this suggests that the ILK was not appropriate for use with individuals 
with intellectual disability.  
It is interesting to note that participants tended to answer “true” to the items 
instead of “false,” despite the fact that the correct answers are approximately evenly split 
between “true” and “false.” On average, 29 of the 32 participants answered “true” to an 
item, whereas only three participants answered “false.” This may mean that this sample 
consisted of many “yea-sayers,” or individuals who tend to respond “true” regardless of 
the content of the item. Further, it is possible that participants simply guessed throughout 
the test and may have correctly answered items by chance. Several items also performed 
poorly across subgroups. In both the forensic and civil samples, 25% or more participants 
incorrectly answered items 20, 25, and 43. This pattern was also seen for competent 
defendants on items 20 and 25. These items tended to be longer than the average 
statement length, have a correct answer of “false,” and contain two clauses. Item 25 is 
about changing pleas and item 43 is related to the concept of “innocent until proven 
guilty.” I hypothesized that item 20, which is about attorney-client confidentiality, would 
be difficult for the sample given that Gottfried and Carbonell (2014) found it to be a 
difficult item across a range of intelligence levels. Additionally, incompetent defendants 
also performed poorly on item 43. Forensic and competent samples performed poorly on 
item 59, which has to do with being appointed an attorney if a defendant is unable to 
afford one. Moreover, the three participants who scored less than 47 on the ILK 
incorrectly answered all of the difficult items except items 44 and 59 (one of the three 
participants correctly answered these items). It is also important to note that less than half 
of the civil participants correctly answered items 44 and 46 (42.1% and 47.4%, 
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respectively). Although these items did not have poor corrected item-total correlations 
and high alpha-if-item-deleted values (with the exception of item 43, which did perform 
poorly on those measures in the incompetent sample), they may be difficult for inpatients 
to correctly answer. Taken together, these findings are troubling given that one tenant of 
the ILK is that the items should be so easy that even a very impaired person or someone 
with limited knowledge of the legal system should be able to correctly answer the 
majority, if not all, of the items. It is also interesting that in Rogers and colleagues (2015) 
examination of short forms of the ILK, all of the items found to be difficult for the 
current sample (items 20, 25, 43, 44, 46, and 59), with the exception of item 59, were 
excluded from both the R-ILK-90, on which only items that 90% of their sample 
correctly answered were retained, and R-ILK-95, on which only items that 95% of their 
sample correctly answered were retained. 
The average inter-item correlation for the total sample was .08; this is very low 
but is comparable to the findings of prior studies (r = .32; Otto et al., 2010). This may 
indicate that the items measure different constructs. Two items in particular performed 
poorly across subgroups in terms of the corrected item-total correlation, alpha if item 
were deleted value, and inter-item correlations: item 44, which is about types of pleas, 
and item 60, which has to do with who can sit on a jury. 
6.1.1 Forensically- and civilly-committed participants. Forensic participants in 
this sample (M = 57.23, SD = 2.98, range = 51 to 61) obtained higher scores on the ILK 
than the reference sample of adults adjudicated incompetent to proceed (M = 50.04, SD = 
8.54, range = 29 to 61; Otto et al., 2010). This is inconsistent with my expectations that 
were based on the results of prior studies that found the ILK to be useful for 
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differentiating between groups asked to feigned incompetence and those asked to respond 
honestly (Gottfried et al., 2015; Guenther & Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 
2015). No forensic participants in this sample were classified as possible feigners, 
whereas the lowest score in the reference sample was in the chance region. It is possible 
that this sample was a group of forensic participants who scored higher on the ILK than 
other samples of forensic inpatients. Given that higher verbal intelligence and prior 
experience with the legal system were found to be related to higher ILK scores, this 
discrepancy may be explained by this sample of forensic patients tending to have higher 
verbal intelligence and more experience with the legal system than other forensic 
samples. However, verbal intelligence was not significantly related to ILK scores in the 
forensic sample, so it could be that prior legal experience alone accounted for the 
discrepancy. Many of the forensic participants had a history of prior incarceration 
(76.5%) and/or a prior offense (88.2%); additionally, many of these participants may 
have had previous evaluations of competence to stand trial. These experiences may 
account for why forensic participants were able to correctly answer more questions on 
average about the legal system. 
 Consistent with my hypothesis, civil participants in this sample (M = 53.53, SD = 
5.33, range = 40 to 59) performed more similarly to their most similar reference sample, 
the community psychiatric inpatients (M = 53.04, SD = 7.59, range = 29 to 61; Otto et al., 
2010), than the forensic participants (M = 57.23, SD = 2.98, range = 51 to 61). However, 
similar to the forensic participants, the lowest score obtained in this sample of civil 
participants was 11 points higher than that of the reference sample. It is again possible 
that this sample of civil participants was a group of inpatients who tended to have more 
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high-scorers than in other samples of inpatients admitted for non-forensic, clinical 
reasons. One possible reason for this discrepancy may be that this sample of civil patients 
tended to have higher verbal intelligence than other clinical samples, given that higher 
verbal intelligence was related to higher ILK scores in the civil sample. There was also a 
significant relationship between onset of illness and ILK scores, with later onset 
associated with higher ILK scores. Thus, it could be that this sample of civil participants 
tended to have higher ILK scores than other samples because they had a later average 
onset than other samples. 
 Although there was a statistically and practically significant mean difference 
between the ILK scores of the forensic and civil participants, this mean difference was 
controlled for by prior offenses, prior incarceration, duration of illness, onset of illness, 
and presence of an anxiety disorder, personality disorder, or intellectual disability. Prior 
offenses and incarceration likely controlled for the mean difference because more 
forensic participants had a prior offense (92.31% of forensic compared to 73.68% of 
civil) and/or had been previously incarcerated (76.92% of forensic compared to 15.79% 
of civil). That is, experience with the legal system likely contributed to their higher total 
score. The idea that forensic participants scored higher on the ILK due in part to prior 
experience with the legal system, and certainly more recent experience than civil 
participants, is further supported by the fact that forensic participants had a higher 
percentage of correct responses than civil participants on a majority of the items (n = 39). 
In terms of duration and onset of illness, civil participants tended to have a shorter 
duration and earlier onset of illness. This finding can largely be explained by the lower 
average age of civil participants as compared to forensic participants. Although not 
INVENTORY OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE                                                                     73  
 
 
significantly different, the mean age of the civil participants was 35.05, while the mean 
age of forensic participants was 41.46. Types of diagnoses did not seem to vary widely 
between the two groups, and the only PAS subscale that the groups differed on was 
Alienation, t(30) = -2.47, p = .019, d = .89. Presence of an anxiety disorder and 
intellectual disability may have controlled for the mean difference in ILK scores because 
the only participants who were diagnosed with each disorder were forensic participants. 
Similarly, the majority of the participants diagnosed with a personality disorder were 
civil (five civil participants as compared to one forensic participant), which likely 
explains why presence of a personality disorder controlled for the mean difference in ILK 
scores. 
6.1.2 Competent and incompetent defendants. Defendants opined to be 
competent in this sample (M = 57.00, SD = 3.51, range = 51 to 61) obtained higher scores 
on the ILK than the reference sample of adult competency examinees opined to be 
competent (M = 50.42, SD = 6.85, range = 34 to 60; Otto et al., 2010). Similarly, 
incompetent defendants (M = 58.33, SD = 3.06, range = 55 to 61) not only performed 
better than the competent defendants, but also obtained an average score well above that 
of the reference sample of adult competency examinees opined to be incompetent (M = 
40.59, SD = 8.53, range = 29 to 55; Otto et al., 2010). Further, incompetent defendants 
obtained a higher percentage of correct responses than competent defendants on 16 of the 
items. These findings are inconsistent with my expectations and the results of prior 
research that found that incompetent defendants performed significantly worse than those 
opined competent (Otto et al., 2010). There were no significant differences between the 
groups in terms of demographic, clinical, or legal variables that might explain the mean 
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difference. However, the sample sizes for these two subgroups were very small (n = 7 for 
competent and n = 3 for incompetent), and it may be that these samples were not 
representative of the general population of defendants admitted to an inpatient hospital 
for an evaluation of trial competence. Another possible explanation is that the 
incompetent defendants were thought to be incompetent because they were unable to 
work with their attorney or had deficits in rational understanding, rather than due to a 
lack of understanding of the legal system. That is, it is possible that the competent and 
incompetent defendants had comparable levels of legal knowledge. The incompetent 
defendants likely were also undergoing competence restoration treatment at the time of 
participation in the study. This treatment typically involves attending group classes 
designed to educate patients about the legal system and/or meeting one-on-one with a 
staff member to learn general facts about the legal process. Such interventions may have 
increased these defendants’ levels of knowledge of the legal process to be similar to that 
of the competent defendants. Additionally, it is unclear from this sample of defendants if 
there is a typical way in which competent and incompetent defendants respond to the 
items on the ILK, and if those response patterns differ. 
6.2 Reliability and Validity of the ILK 
 
6.2.1 Reliability. Prior studies have found that internal consistency reliability of 
the ILK to be .88 (Otto et al., 2010) and .91 (Guenther & Otto, 2010). The internal 
consistency reliability estimate from the current sample was slightly lower at .806, but is 
still considered desirable according to standards for Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951). 
It is interesting to note that, across the subgroups, alpha was quite a bit lower for the 
forensic participants at .652 than any of the other subgroups. This may indicate that the 
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ILK functioned differently for forensic participants; specifically, the items may have been 
less related. Perhaps having more legal experience lead this group to overthink some of 
their answers to some of the items and thus respond in ways that were incongruent with 
the purpose of the test. This is further supported the average inter-item correlation for the 
forensic participants (r = .071), which was the lowest of all the subgroups. Alternatively, 
the forensic group may have had the lowest alpha value due to there being less variability 
in these participants’ total scores (SD = 2.98) than the other groups. Reliability 
coefficients are small when the true score variance of a group is small. When excluding 
the six difficult items, the alpha coefficients for the total sample, civil participants, and 
competent defendants decreased. The alpha coefficients for the forensic participants and 
incompetent defendants increased slightly. This suggests that, overall, exclusion of those 
items does not notably increase the reliability of the instrument. 
6.2.2 Validity. I expected a moderate, negative correlation between ILK scores 
and presence of secondary gain if the instrument functioned as a validity test in the 
sample; that is, likelihood to feign incompetence was thought to be associated with a low 
ILK score. Although the observed correlation was moderate, there was a positive 
relationship between ILK scores and secondary gain. That is, presence of secondary gain 
(i.e., having a forensic status) was associated with better performance on the ILK. This 
may suggest that the ILK functioned more similarly to a test of legal knowledge in this 
sample given that those with possibly more experience, and certainly more recent 
experience, with the legal system obtained a higher score on the test than those admitted 
to the hospital non-forensic, clinical reasons. Further, there was a significant and practical 
difference between the average ILK scores of forensic and civil participants, with 
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forensic participants answering an average of four more questions correctly. I expected 
forensic participants to have lower ILK scores than the civil participants given that they 
have more of an incentive to feign incompetence. As mentioned earlier, it is important to 
note that forensic status was used as a proxy for feigning, and it is likely that no 
participants feigned incompetence during participation due to lack of incentive to do so. 
This mean difference was controlled for by prior offenses, prior incarceration, duration of 
illness, onset of illness, and presence of an anxiety disorder, personality disorder, or 
intellectual disability. As previously discussed, it is likely that prior experience with the 
legal system and less severe symptoms at the time of participation account for why 
forensic participants performed better on the ILK. The fact that variables related to prior 
criminal justice experience controlled for the mean difference between the two groups 
suggests that the difference in performance on the ILK is due in part to exposure to the 
legal system; this provides more support for the function of the instrument as a test of 
legal knowledge in this sample. 
 The incompetent defendants in this sample performed quite differently than those 
in prior studies (Otto et al., 2010), as previously mentioned. Specifically, they performed 
approximately the same on the ILK as competent defendants. I expected that, if the ILK 
functioned as a test of legal knowledge in this sample, the incompetent defendants would 
score much lower than those opined to be competent if the incompetent defendants were 
opined to be incompetent due to a lack of understanding of the legal system. The similar 
performance of the two groups may suggest that ILK performance is not related to 
impairment level or a lack of understanding of the legal system, given that incompetent 
defendants tend to be opined incompetent due to illness severity and/or a lack of 
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understanding of the nature of the legal process. Contrary to the results of the forensic 
and civil participant comparison, this group comparison suggests that the ILK may have 
functioned as a validity test in this sample. However, as previously discussed, it may 
have been that the incompetent defendants had similar levels of legal knowledge as the 
competent defendants. 
 Convergent validity evidence was also examined. Although ILK scores and RFIT 
combination scores were not significantly related, there was a moderate, positive 
correlation between ILK scores and RFIT recall scores. There was also no relationship 
between ILK scores and PAS total probability scores. It is troubling that, although 
participants did score below the cut scores on the RFIT and the ILK, no participants were 
classified as possible feigners on both validity measures. Similarly, no participants who 
scored below expectation on the ILK were classified as potential feigners on the PAS. 
That is, there was no convergent validity between the ILK and the other validity 
measures. This finding is in stark contrast to a prior study in which a moderate, positive 
correlation was found between the RFIT and the ILK (Otto et al., 2011). This may have 
occurred because the RFIT evaluates cognitive effort rather than feigned incompetence 
like the ILK; the three participants who scored below the cut score on the ILK and thus 
may have been feigning incompetence likely were not also feigning cognitive deficits. 
Similarly, the six participants who scored above expectation on the PAS may have only 
been exaggerating psychological symptoms rather than feigning incompetence. It is 
interesting to note, however, that three participants were classified as feigning on the 
PAS and the RFIT combination and two participants were classified as feigning on the 
PAS and RFIT recall. Perhaps these participants were using multiple feigning strategies 
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(i.e., exaggerating memory deficits and symptom severity), but were not feigning 
incompetence. 
 I expected the range to be restricted above the highest cut score (i.e., 48 and 
higher) for the total sample. Additionally, I expected only those who had secondary gain 
in the form of legal charges to score below the highest cut score (i.e., 47). When 
examining a bar chart of the distribution of scores by forensic status, it is clear that the 
majority of the scores were located above 48 (see Figure 1). However, only civil 
participants scored below 47. The three participants who were classified as possible 
feigners may have been more impaired than the average participants. Two of the 
participants did poorly on the RFIT, although they did not score below the cut scores. 
Two of the participants had a reading level as measured by the WRAT-4 word reading 
subtest that was lower than the total sample’s average reading level, indicating that these 
participants may have had poor verbal intelligence as compared to others. Additionally, 
none of the three participants had any prior experience with the legal system. It may be 
that they performed poorly on the ILK due to their lack of exposure to the legal system 
and/or because of lower overall functioning. In either case, this provides some support 
against the function of the ILK as a validity test in this sample given that even an 
impaired person with limited criminal justice experience should be able to obtain a score 
above 47. On the other hand, it may also be that these participants represent outliers and 
were not representative of the larger population of psychiatric inpatients. 
6.3 Performance in Relation to Other Variables 
 
Verbal intelligence as measured by the WRAT-4 seemed to be related to ILK 
performance in this sample, which is consistent with a prior finding that found a 
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moderate, positive relationship between a measure of intelligence and ILK scores 
(Gottfried & Carbonell, 2014). There was a moderate, positive relationship between 
WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores and ILK scores. That is, higher verbal skills were 
associated with higher scores on the ILK. This significant relationship was found for the 
total sample and the civil participants, but not for forensic participants. This may be 
because the range of WRAT-4 standard scores was more restricted for the forensic 
participants (range = 80 to 111) as compared to the civil participants (range = 79 to 113). 
Additionally, only four (30.8%) forensic participants obtained a score below the mean for 
the total sample of 88.95, while nine (47.4%) civil participants scored lower than the 
mean. In particular, items 16 and 20 were related to the WRAT-4 word reading subtest 
scores with moderate, positive correlations. These items have to do with the relationship 
between the defendant and defense attorney, and both have correct answers of “false.” 
Presumably, these items require a higher verbal intelligence or cognitive capacity in order 
to provide a correct response because in order to correctly answer them, the examinee 
would have to know that the true statement is the opposite of the given statement. The 
positive, moderate correlations indicated that better verbal intelligence was associated 
with an increased likelihood of correctly answering these items. A relationship between 
verbal skills and ILK scores is not desirable if the ILK is to be used as a validity test. It 
would not be desirable for individuals with low intelligence to be classified as possible 
feigners if they are responding to the best of their ability. 
ILK scores were significantly associated with onset of illness and prior 
incarceration, both with a moderate, positive relationship. That is, higher scores on the 
ILK were associated with a later age at which psychiatric symptoms began and having 
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had a prior incarceration. Onset of illness was only significantly related to ILK scores 
within civil participants, not forensic. This may be because there was less variability in 
the scores of forensic participants (SD = 2.98) as compared to civil participants (SD = 
5.34). Additionally, only six (50% of those with a reported onset) forensic participants 
had an onset earlier than the total average, while 12 (70.6% of those with a reported 
onset) civil participants had an earlier onset. Presumably having a later onset of illness is 
associated with lower severity of illness (i.e., less time for symptoms to manifest). It also 
may be that those with a later onset of illness completed more years of education, which 
tends to be related to better functional outcomes. Indeed, of those who took the ILK, had 
an appropriate reading level for the ILK (≥ 5th grade), and had an onset of illness later 
than the average onset (n = 11), none did not complete high school and four completed 
more than 12 years of education. In contrast, of those who had an earlier onset (n = 18), 
six did not complete high school and two completed more than 12 years of education. 
The correlation between prior incarceration and performance on the ILK is further 
support that the ILK may have functioned as a test of legal knowledge in this sample, as 
previously discussed. In sum, it appears that ILK scores were related to proxies for illness 
severity and exposure to the legal system. 
Oddly, the mean total ILK score for females (M = 50.88, SD = 5.46) was 
significantly lower than that of males (M = 56.42, SD = 3.79). This mean difference 
persisted even after controlling for forensic status/presence of secondary gain, education, 
WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores, prior offenses, prior incarceration, diagnoses, 
onset of illness, and duration of illness. This may have occurred because of those who 
scored below 47 on the ILK, two were females and one was male. That is, 33.3% of 
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females scored below the highest cut score, while only 4.2% of males obtained that low 
of a score. This mean difference is thought to be a spurious finding of the sample, given 
that there is no theoretical reason to explain why females performed more poorly on the 
ILK than males. 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
6.4.1 Psychometric properties of the ILK. The reliability estimate for the total 
sample provided support for adequate reliability of the ILK when used in this sample, 
although the estimate was lower than estimates found in prior studies. However, the 
average inter-item correlation for the total sample was very low and may indicate that not 
all of the items on the ILK were measuring the same construct (i.e., feigned 
incompetence).  
 In terms of validity evidence, the results were mixed. Initially, the strongest 
support for the ILK functioning like a validity test in this sample was the lack of a mean 
difference between competent and incompetent defendants; presumably this indicates that 
impairment and a possible lack of understanding of the nature of the legal process were 
unrelated to performance on the test, assuming that no participants were feigning and the 
defendants were opined incompetent due to a lack of understanding of the legal system. 
However, both onset of illness and prior incarceration were related to ILK performance, 
which suggests that severity of symptoms and prior exposure to the legal system actually 
were related to performance on the ILK. The range of total scores on the ILK was mostly 
restricted to above the highest cut score. This finding may mean that the test did function 
as a validity test, given that I expected the majority of the scores to be located above the 
highest cut score if the test functioned like a typical performance validity test. That is, the 
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majority of items may have been so easy that those who were not feigning were able to 
score well above the highest cut score. Alternatively, this result could indicate that this 
sample had generally high levels of legal knowledge that enabled them to perform fairly 
well on the test. However, I also expected that only forensic participants would score 
below the cut score. The fact that only civil participants with no prior exposure to the 
legal system scored below expectation on the test, therefore, further supports the idea that 
the test may not have functioned as a validity measure in the sample. Additionally, the 
finding that variables related previous legal experience eliminated the mean difference 
between forensic and civil participants indicates that forensic participants obtained higher 
total ILK scores due in part to their prior legal experience. 
 Evidence of convergent validity was also lacking. ILK scores did correlate with 
presence of secondary gain/forensic status. The relationship was positive rather than 
negative; a negative correlation would have indicated that presence of secondary gain 
was associated with lower ILK total scores, thereby supporting its utility as a validity test. 
The positive relationship reflects the fact that forensic participants performed better on 
the ILK than civil participants in this sample, which supports the idea of the ILK 
functioning like a test of legal knowledge. ILK scores were not related to PAS total 
probability scores, and no participants who scored above expectation on the PAS also 
scored below expectation on the ILK. Although ILK scores were related to RFIT recall 
scores, it is perplexing that no participants were classified as possible feigners by both the 
RFIT and ILK. As previously discussed, it is possible that if any participants were 
feigning, they feigned either only memory deficits or a lack of legal knowledge. The PAS 
was used as a symptom validity measure. It makes sense that participants may have been 
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exaggerating psychiatric symptoms but not feigning incompetence, which would explain 
why the scores were not related and no participants were classified as possible feigners 
on both measures. Similarly, the RFIT is a test of memory and participants may have 
been exaggerating memory deficits but not a feigned lack of legal knowledge. This 
difference in feigning strategies would explain why no participants were classified as 
feigners on both measures. Alternatively, it is possible that participants had trouble with a 
memory test (i.e., the RFIT) but not questions about the legal system, or vice versa.   
6.4.2 Concerns regarding use of the ILK in an inpatient setting. Several items 
appeared to be difficult for both the total sample and subgroups. Many of these items 
were found to not be answered correctly by 95% of a sample used to examine short forms 
of the ILK (Rogers et al., 2015). Taken together, these results suggest that not all items 
on the ILK are so easy that virtually everyone can correctly answer them, which is a core 
tenant of the ILK. Caution should be taken when interpreting the results of the ILK when 
using these items, particularly if a defendant is classified as possibly feigning and the 
majority of their incorrect responses were on these items. Particular attention should be 
paid to items 16 and 20, which were related to a measure of verbal intelligence. It is also 
important to note that ILK total scores were related to verbal skills, with higher scores 
associated with better WRAT-4 word reading subtest scores. This suggests that the ILK 
may not be appropriate for use with very low functioning defendants or defendants 
experiencing active symptoms that may cause serious impairment. Moreover, the ILK 
was not appropriate for use with individuals with a diagnosis of intellectual disability in 
this sample given that all of the participants who took the test but did not have the 
appropriate reading level scored below expectation (i.e., were classified as feigning) and 
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were diagnosed with intellectual disability (n = 4). This is a particularly important finding 
given the high prevalence of intellectual disability in forensic populations. 
It is also important to think about the ethical implications of utilizing the ILK in 
clinical forensic settings, given that labeling a defendant as a feigner can have serious 
consequences. Consistent with the test authors’ recommendations, the results of the study 
suggest that a reading test should be given in addition to the ILK in order to ensure that 
interpretation of ILK results are warranted. As previously discussed, in the current 
sample, all participants who took the ILK but did not have an appropriate reading level 
scored below 47 on the test (n = 4). Three of these participants had completed high 
school and the fourth participant had completed 11 years of education. Thus, education 
level should not be used as a proxy for reading level. I would also like to suggest against 
clinicians using the ILK as the only indication of feigning. The results of the current 
study suggest that more research is needed to determine if the ILK functions as a typical 
validity test; therefore, the conclusions one can make from the test as it is currently 
constructed are limited. Clinicians should consider the results of other validity tests and 
obtain collateral information from all available sources (e.g., family, friends, treating 
psychologist and psychiatrist, unit staff members, and/or attorney) when making opinions 
regarding feigning. 
6.5 Limitations, Implications, and Recommendations for Future Research 
As previously mentioned, the most notable limitation of this study was use of 
forensic participants as a proxy for feigners. The study had no impact on their legal status 
and thus they had no incentive to feign during participation. That is, it is likely that the 
forensic participants represented a group who had more, and certainly more recent, 
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exposure to the legal system than the civil participants, rather than a group more likely to 
feign incompetence than civil participants. This limitation restricted the conclusions that I 
could make about the utility of the ILK in the present sample. The small sample size 
placed additional limitations on possible inferences that could be drawn from the results 
of the study. Specifically, the sample included a small number of forensic participants for 
comparison. The sample may also not be representative of the larger population of 
psychiatric inpatients; it may be that the civil sample consisted of especially low-scorers 
and the forensic sample consisted of especially high-scorers. Further, parameter estimates 
(e.g., mean scores) tend to have a great deal of sampling error when small samples are 
used, which limits how much confidence can be placed in inferences that are made about 
the population based on estimates from the small sample. 
 Despite the limitations, the current study contributes to the literature on the ILK 
by examining its utility in a design that mirrored a situation in which the ILK would 
actually be administered in practice more so than the simulation designs that have 
previously been used to examine the function of the ILK (Gottfried et al., 2015; Guenther 
& Otto, 2010; Otto et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 2015). The sample also included 
individuals diagnosed with intellectual disability; the utility of the ILK when used with 
those with intellectual disability has only been examined in a few prior studies. 
Additionally, it is useful for forensic evaluators to know the reliability and validity 
evidence of a test so that they can make an informed decision regarding use of the test in 
their evaluations. It may also be useful for forensic evaluators to be able to speak to the 
psychometric properties of the instrument in the event that they are asked to testify on a 
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case in which they used the ILK. Evaluators should also be aware of items that tend to 
perform poorly so they can properly frame their findings in their reports. 
 I would like to make recommendations for future research on the utility of the 
ILK in psychiatric inpatient samples. First, it is important to evaluate its effectiveness for 
detecting feigned incompetence in a larger sample so as to decrease sampling error and 
increase the precision of the parameter estimates. It would be interesting to include 
samples of inpatients from a range of hospitals in order to obtain a sample that is 
representative of the population of inpatients across all psychiatric hospitals. Second, 
future research could focus on examining the psychometric properties of short forms of 
the ILK, as was done by Rogers and colleagues (2015). With the exception of one item, 
the items found to be difficult for the sample used in this study were excluded from 
Rogers and colleagues’ (2015) short forms of the ILK because the majority of their 
sample did not correctly answer those items. Their short forms tended to have better 
psychometric properties than the full ILK. Taken together, these results suggest that those 
items may need to be removed from the ILK in order to improve its utility for detecting 
feigning. On the other hand, research could be done to determine if simplifying the 
language of these items improves the rate of correct responses. Third, although 
simulation studies with known groups are useful for evaluating the psychometric 
properties of the ILK in a controlled design, they are limited in that they are not 
representative of a situation in which the ILK would be administered in practice. One 
possible design would be similar to that of the current study, but would include the 
important addition of obtaining the treatment team’s and/or evaluator’s opinion regarding 
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whether they believed that the defendant was feigning incompetence or experiencing 
genuine symptoms that are impeding competence-related abilities.  
If unlimited time and resources were available, I would design a study in which a 
battery of tests was administered to defendants admitted to a psychiatric hospital for an 
evaluation of adjudicative competence. Ideally, the defendants would be randomly 
sampled from several psychiatric hospitals representing different regions of the country 
to obtain a total sample that is representative of the population of defendants undergoing 
CST evaluations. I would assemble a test battery consisting of the ILK, the WRAT-4 
word reading subtest, an intelligence test, a listening comprehension test, a working 
memory test, several SVTs, and several PVTs. The WRAT-4 word reading subtest would 
be used to obtain the reading level of the defendant to determine if interpretation of the 
ILK is warranted, and the intelligence test would serve as a measure of general 
intelligence. The listening comprehension test and working memory test would be 
pertinent given that the ILK is read aloud to examinees. Possible SVTs include the 
Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology and the symptom validity scales in 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2. Possible PVTs include the Test of 
Memory Malingering, the Dot Counting Test, and the Rey Fifteen Item Memory Test 
plus Recognition. I would correlate scores on these measures to scores on the ILK and 
identify defendants who were classified as feigning on multiple measures; this would 
allow me to determine if individuals engaging in different types of feigning strategies are 
also likely to feign incompetence. 
The day of or the day before the defendant participates in the study, I would 
obtain an opinion from both the treating psychiatrist and psychologist, and possibly other 
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treatment team members or the forensic evaluator, regarding whether the defendant is 
feigning incompetence. I would compare the opinions of the professionals to get multiple 
viewpoints on the likelihood of a defendant feigning. Additionally, the opinions would be 
compared to the ultimate decision made by the forensic evaluator regarding trial 
competence. The scores on the tests could also be correlated with the opinions and 
ultimate decision to see which tests have the strongest relationship with an external 
indication of feigning. Logistic regression analyses could also be conducted. The 
dependent variables would be the opinions of the treating professionals, and the 
predictors would be test scores. This analysis would allow me to determine how the ILK 
compares to other validity tests in terms of its ability to predict feigning. It would also be 
interesting to construct a hierarchical linear regression model to determine if likelihood of 
feigning varies as a function of characteristics of psychiatric hospitals. I would conduct 
an item analysis, as was done for the current study, to get a sense of what items perform 
poorly or seem to be difficult for the sample. This type of research design would allow 
for evaluation of the utility of the ILK in a legitimate, non-artificial way that also 
incorporates both an external indication of feigning and several other measures of both 
symptom and cognitive feigning strategies. 
Although this design would not remove the limitation of the current study that the 
participants may not have any incentive to feign during participation, it would eliminate 
using forensic participants as a proxy for a group more likely to feign because the results 
of the defendants would not need to be compared to another group (i.e., participants 
admitted for clinical reasons). This would be a more desirable approach because the 
researcher would not assume that all defendants are more likely to feign simply because 
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of the presence of secondary gain. Additionally, a larger sample size should result in a 
sample that is more representative of the population and has less sampling error; this 
would remedy the limitations of the current study that are associated with a small sample 
size.  




Sample ILK Items 













The judge is supposed to assume that the defendant is not guilty. 
Note. Reproduced by special permission of the Publisher, Psychological Assessment Resources, 
Inc. (PAR), 16204 North Florida Avenue, Lutz, Florida 33549, from the Inventory of Legal 
Knowledge™ by Jeffrey E. Musick, PhD, ABPP and Randy K. Otto, PhD, ABPP, Copyright 
2010 by PAR. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission from PAR. 
  








(N = 40) 
Forensic 
(n = 17) 
Civil 
(n = 23) 
Competent 
(n = 8) 
Incompetent 









35.13 (14.23) 39.13 (12.88) 43.50 (14.01) 
Gender 
     Male 


















     Caucasian 
     African-American 
     Asian 





























12.33 (1.99) 12.65 (1.54) 12.09 (2.27) 13.13 (2.10) 12.50 (1.00) 
Special Education 
 
12 (30%) 6 (35.3%) 6 (26.1%) 2 (25%) 2 (50%) 
Employment Status 
     Unemployed 
     Disabled 























     Never Married 
     Divorced 







































(N = 40) 
Forensic 
(n = 17) 
Civil 
(n = 23) 
Competent 
(n = 8) 
Incompetent 
(n = 4) 
 
Substance Use History 30 (75%) 13 (76.5%) 17 (73.9%) 6 (75%) 3 (75%) 
Prior Psychiatric Hospitalization 
 
36 (90%) 16 (94.1%) 20 (87%) 7 (87.5%) 4 (100%) 
Prior Psychiatric Medication 
 
36 (90%) 15 (88.2%) 21 (91.3%) 6 (75%) 4 (100%) 
Prior Offenses 
 
30 (75%) 15 (88.2%) 15 (65.2%) 8 (100%) 3 (75%) 
Prior Incarceration 
 
17 (42.5%) 13 (76.5%) 4 (17.4%) 6 (75%) 3 (75%) 
Onset of Illness 
(n = 33, 15, 18, 3, 7)1 
 
21.27 (9.47) 22.87 (11.28) 19.94 (7.73) 23.14 (9.81) 33.00 (15.87) 
Duration of Illness 
(n = 35, 16, 19, 3, 8)1 
 
15.46 (11.28) 17.06 (9.78) 14.11 (12.50) 18.88 (8.56) 10.00 (13.86) 
Diagnoses2 
     Neurodevelopmental 
     Schizophrenia Spectrum 
     Bipolar 
     Depression 
     Anxiety 
     Trauma Disorder 
     Substance Use Disorder 
     Personality Disorder 




















































Note. Data are listed as mean (standard deviation) or number of participants (percentage). 1 Data were not available regarding onset and duration of illness for 
all participants. Sample sizes are listed for total, forensic, civil, competent, and incompetent samples. 2 Both primary and secondary diagnoses are reported. It 
is possible that a patient had multiple diagnoses.  





Criminal and Legal Information for Forensic Sample 
Criminal and Legal Variables 
Forensic 
(n = 17) 
Competent  
(n = 8) 
Incompetent 
(n = 4) 
 
Number of Offenses 
     Felonies 
     Misdemeanors 
 
 
2.53 (1.70, 1 to 6) 
1 (1.12, 0 to 6) 
1.53 (1.51, 0 to 4) 
 
2.88 (1.85, 1 to 6) 
1.25 (1.49, 0 to 4) 
1.63 (1.85, 0 to 6) 
 
2.25 (1.50, 1 to 4) 
1 (.816, 0 to 2) 
1.25 (.957, 0 to 2) 
Multiple Offenses 
 
10 (58.8%) 5 (62.5%) 2 (50%) 
Court Finding of Competence 
     Competent 











Note. Data are listed as mean (standard deviation, range) or number of participants (percentage). 
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(N = 40) 
Forensic 
(n = 17) 
Civil 
(n = 23) 
Competent 
(n = 8) 
Incompetent 
(n = 4) 
 
ILK (n = 32, 13, 19, 7, 3)1 
     Total 
     Cumulative Percentile 




























RFIT (n = 39, 17, 22, 8, 4) 
     Recall 
     Recognition 
     False Positive Recognitions 



























WRAT-4 Word Reading  
(n = 37, 16, 21, 8, 4) 
     Raw 
     Standard Score 



























     (continued) 
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(N = 40) 
Forensic 
(n = 17) 
Civil 
(n = 23) 
Competent 
(n = 8) 
Incompetent 
(n = 4) 
 
PAS Probability Scores 
     Total (n = 32, 11, 21, 6, 3) 
     Negative Affect (n = 38, 15, 23, 8, 4) 
     Acting Out (n = 38, 15, 23, 8, 4) 
     Health Problems (n = 37, 14, 23, 7, 4) 
     Psychotic Features (n = 37, 15, 22, 8, 4) 
     Social Withdrawal (n = 38, 16, 22, 8, 4) 
     Hostile Control (n = 37, 14, 23,7, 4) 
     Suicidal Thinking (n = 39, 16, 23, 8, 4) 
     Alienation (n = 39, 16, 23, 8, ) 
     Alcohol Problems (n = 39, 16, 23, 8, 4) 





































































Note. Data are listed as mean (standard deviation). Complete data were not available for all participants. Sample sizes are listed for total, forensic, civil, 
competent, and incompetent samples. ILK = Inventory of Legal Knowledge. RFIT = Rey Fifteen Item Test. WRAT-4 = Wide Range Achievement Test Version 
4. PAS = Personality Assessment Screener. 1 Data for the ILK include only those who had a grade equivalent WRAT-4 score of equal to or above 5th grade. 
  




Item Analysis for Total Sample 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
1 0.235 0.803 
2 0.315 0.801 
3 0.168 0.805 
4 --- --- 
5 0.194 0.805 
6 --- --- 
7 0.407 0.797 
8 0.164 0.806 
9 0.202 0.805 
10 --- --- 
11 0.336 0.800 
12 0.347 0.802 
13 0.116 0.806 
14 0.238 0.803 
15 0.008 0.809 
16 0.595 0.792 
17 0.031 0.809 
18 0.116 0.806 
19 --- --- 
20 0.547 0.790 
21 0.116 0.806 
22 0.170 0.805 
23 0.542 0.799 
24 0.032 0.808 
25 0.506 0.793 
26 --- --- 
27 --- --- 
28 --- --- 
29 0.365 0.800 
30 --- --- 
31 0.170 0.805 
32 0.360 0.799 
33 0.168 0.805 
34 0.257 0.803 
35 0.542 0.799 
36 0.308 0.803 
37 --- --- 
38 -0.111 0.809 
39 0.542 0.799 
40 --- --- 
41 0.373 0.799 
42 0.207 0.805 
43 0.432 0.796 
44 0.053 0.813 
45 0.116 0.806 
46 0.318 0.801 
47 0.337 0.801 
48 0.474 0.797 
49 0.360 0.799 
50 0.170 0.805 
(continued) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Item Analysis for Total Sample 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
51 --- --- 
52 --- --- 
53 0.113 0.807 
54 0.353 0.799 
55 0.381 0.799 
56 0.002 0.807 
57 -0.035 0.808 
58 0.254 0.803 
59 0.053 0.809 
60 0.308 0.803 
61 0.235 0.803 
Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants 
did not respond in the same way to the item. 
  


























1 92.3 84.2 1.10 100 100 1.00 
2 84.6 84.2 1.00 100 66.7 1.50 
3 100 84.2 1.19 100 100 1.00 
4 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
5 92.3 84.2 1.10 100 100 1.00 
6 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
7 76.9 84.2 0.91 100 66.7 1.50 
8 84.6 84.2 1.00 71.4 100 0.71 
9 84.6 84.2 1.00 85.7 100 0.86 
10 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
11 76.9 84.2 0.91 85.7 33.3 2.57 
12 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
13 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
14 92.3 89.5 1.03 85.7 100 0.86 
15 100 84.2 1.19 100 100 1.00 
16 100 78.9 1.27 100 100 1.00 
17 100 84.2 1.19 100 100 1.00 
18 92.3 100 0.92 85.7 100 0.86 
19 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
20 69.2 57.9 1.20 42.9 100 0.43 
21 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
22 92.3 94.7 0.97 85.7 100 0.86 
23 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
24 100 89.5 1.12 100 100 1.00 
25 69.2 73.7 0.94 57.1 100 0.57 
26 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
27 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
28 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
29 92.3 94.7 0.97 100 66.7 1.50 
30 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
31 100 89.5 1.12 100 100 1.00 
32 92.3 84.2 1.10 85.7 100 0.86 
33 92.3 89.5 1.03 85.7 100 0.86 
34 76.9 78.9 0.97 85.7 66.7 1.28 
35 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
36 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
37 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
38 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
39 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
40 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
41 92.3 78.9 1.17 85.7 100 0.86 
42 84.6 73.7 1.15 71.4 100 0.71 
43 69.2 52.6 1.32 85.7 33.3 2.57 
44 92.3 42.1 2.19 85.7 100 0.86 
(continued) 
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Table 6 (continued) 






















45 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
46 92.3 47.4 1.95 100 100 1.00 
47 100 89.5 1.12 100 100 1.00 
48 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
49 92.3 89.5 1.03 85.7 100 0.86 
50 92.3 84.2 1.10 100 100 1.00 
51 100 89.5 1.12 100 100 1.00 
52 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
53 100 100 1.00 100 100 1.00 
54 100 78.9 1.27 100 100 1.00 
55 100 73.7 1.36 100 100 1.00 
56 92.3 84.2 1.10 85.7 100 0.86 
57 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
58 92.3 100 0.92 100 100 1.00 
59 69.2 78.9 0.88 71.4 100 0.71 
60 92.3 84.2 1.10 85.7 100 0.86 
61 100 94.7 1.06 100 100 1.00 
Note. Item discrimination was calculated by dividing the percentage of correct responses from 
forensic/competent participants by the percentage of correct responses from civil/incompetent patients. 
Ratios greater than 1 indicate that forensic/competent participants had a higher percentage of correct 
responses, ratios less than 1 indicate that civil/incompetent participants had a higher percentage of correct 
responses, and ratios equal to 1 indicate that both groups had the same percentage of correct responses. 
  




Item Analysis for Forensic Sample 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
1 0.031 0.657 
2 0.214 0.643 
3 --- --- 
4 --- --- 
5 0.134 0.649 
6 --- --- 
7 0.296 0.633 
8 -0.091 0.672 
9 -0.017 0.665 
10 --- --- 
11 0.296 0.633 
12 --- --- 
13 --- --- 
14 0.567 0.616 
15 --- --- 
16 --- --- 
17 --- --- 
18 0.567 0.616 
19 --- --- 
20 0.455 0.611 
21 --- --- 
22 0.567 0.616 
23 --- --- 
24 --- --- 
25 0.192 0.647 
26 --- --- 
27 --- --- 
28 --- --- 
29 0.134 0.649 
30 --- --- 
31 --- --- 
32 0.239 0.641 
33 0.567 0.616 
34 -0.039 0.672 
35 --- --- 
36 --- --- 
37 --- --- 
38 --- --- 
39 --- --- 
40 --- --- 
41 0.567 0.616 
42 0.633 0.598 
43 0.192 0.647 
44 -0.362 0.684 
45 --- --- 
46 0.031 0.657 
47 --- --- 
48 --- --- 
49 -0.070 0.664 
50 0.134 0.649 
51 --- --- 
52 --- --- 
(continued) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Item Analysis for Forensic Sample 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
53 --- --- 
54 --- --- 
55 --- --- 
56 0.567 0.616 
57 --- --- 
58 0.134 0.649 
59 0.069 0.662 
60 -0.070 0.664 
61 --- --- 
Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants 
did not respond in the same way to the item. 
 
  




Item Analysis for Civil Sample 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
1 0.257 0.807 
2 0.404 0.803 
3 0.086 0.812 
4 --- --- 
5 0.171 0.810 
6 --- --- 
7 0.614 0.796 
8 0.286 0.806 
9 0.315 0.805 
10 --- --- 
11 0.493 0.800 
12 0.350 0.806 
13 0.072 0.811 
14 0.142 0.810 
15 -0.109 0.818 
16 0.601 0.795 
17 -0.082 0.817 
18 --- --- 
19 --- --- 
20 0.603 0.793 
21 0.072 0.811 
22 0.072 0.811 
23 0.587 0.801 
24 -0.057 0.815 
25 0.764 0.788 
26 --- --- 
27 --- --- 
28 --- --- 
29 0.587 0.801 
30 --- --- 
31 0.109 0.811 
32 0.374 0.804 
33 0.042 0.813 
34 0.438 0.801 
35 0.587 0.801 
36 0.303 0.807 
37 --- --- 
38 -0.199 0.816 
39 0.587 0.801 
40 --- --- 
41 0.280 0.807 
42 0.045 0.815 
43 0.493 0.798 
44 -0.099 0.822 
45 0.072 0.811 
46 0.220 0.810 
47 0.313 0.806 
48 --- --- 
49 0.700 0.796 
50 0.404 0.803 
51 0.109 0.811 
52 --- --- 
(continued) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Item Analysis for Civil Sample 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
53 --- --- 
54 -0.001 0.816 
55 0.283 0.807 
56 0.315 0.805 
57 -0.064 0.814 
58 --- --- 
59 0.465 0.800 
60 0.029 0.814 
61 0.303 0.807 
Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants 
did not respond in the same way to the item. 
 
  




Item Analysis for Competent Defendants 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
1 --- --- 
2 --- --- 
3 --- --- 
4 --- --- 
5 --- --- 
6 --- --- 
7 0.279 0.753 
8 -0.138 0.788 
9 -0.107 0.778 
10 --- --- 
11 0.701 0.724 
12 --- --- 
13 --- --- 
14 0.701 0.724 
15 --- --- 
16 --- --- 
17 --- --- 
18 0.701 0.724 
19 --- --- 
20 0.732 0.711 
21 --- --- 
22 0.701 0.724 
23 --- --- 
24 --- --- 
25 0.514 0.733 
26 --- --- 
27 --- --- 
28 --- --- 
29 --- --- 
30 --- --- 
31 --- --- 
32 0.279 0.753 
33 0.701 0.724 
34 -0.348 0.792 
35 --- --- 
36 --- --- 
37 --- --- 
38 --- --- 
39 --- --- 
40 --- --- 
41 0.701 0.724 
42 0.836 0.704 
43 0.279 0.753 
44 -0.463 0.798 
45 --- --- 
46 --- --- 
47 --- --- 
48 --- --- 
49 -0.107 0.778 
50 --- --- 
51 --- --- 
52 --- --- 
(continued) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Item Analysis for Competent Defendants 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
53 --- --- 
54 --- --- 
55 --- --- 
56 0.701 0.724 
57 --- --- 
58 --- --- 
59 0.158 0.765 
60 -0.107 0.778 
61 --- --- 
Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants 
did not respond in the same way to the item. 
 
  




Item Analysis for Incompetent Defendants 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
1 --- --- 
2 0.918 0.921 
3 --- --- 
4 --- --- 
5 --- --- 
6 --- --- 
7 0.918 0.921 
8 --- --- 
9 --- --- 
10 --- --- 
11 0.655 0.952 
12 --- --- 
13 --- --- 
14 --- --- 
15 --- --- 
16 --- --- 
17 --- --- 
18 --- --- 
19 --- --- 
20 --- --- 
21 --- --- 
22 --- --- 
23 --- --- 
24 --- --- 
25 --- --- 
26 --- --- 
27 --- --- 
28 --- --- 
29 0.918 0.921 
30 --- --- 
31 --- --- 
32 --- --- 
33 --- --- 
34 0.918 0.921 
35 --- --- 
36 --- --- 
37 --- --- 
38 --- --- 
39 --- --- 
40 --- --- 
41 --- --- 
42 --- --- 
43 0.655 0.952 
44 --- --- 
45 --- --- 
46 --- --- 
47 --- --- 
48 --- --- 
49 --- --- 
50 --- --- 
51 --- --- 
52 --- --- 
(continued) 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Item Analysis for Incompetent Defendants 
Item Corrected Item-Total Correlation Alpha-If-Item-Deleted 
53 --- --- 
54 --- --- 
55 --- --- 
56 --- --- 
57 --- --- 
58 --- --- 
59 --- --- 
60 --- --- 
61 --- --- 
Note. Corrected item-total correlations and alpha-if-item-deleted values are only reported if all participants 
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Distribution of ILK Total Scores for Forensic and Civil Samples
Forensic Civil
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